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ABSTRACT
My work centers on drawing economic insights about the macroeconomy based on
disaggregated mechanisms and empirical patterns. In my first chapter, I study tech-
nology upgrading in the Chinese manufacturing sector and its dynamics after trade
liberalization. I first document that Chinese firms often engage in capital substitu-
tion episodes, during which firm labor productivity increases, labor shares drop, and
skill intensity increases. A model in which firms adopt new skill-intensive technology
through investment in capital upgrading naturally rationalizes these facts, linking
capital substitution events to technological change. Empirically, trade liberalization
shocks reduce capital substitution at Chinese firms, raising the possibility that trade
liberalization may delay short-run growth. I then build a quantitative GE model
with heterogeneous firms, capital upgrading, and trade liberalization shocks. After
liberalization in the model, strategically delayed capital upgrading by firms pushes
technological and consumption gains further into the future, meaningfully expanding
the horizon over which trade gains manifest themselves.
In the second chapter, I exploit rich data on tens of millions of housing transactions
from Zillow to document poor house price growth in manufacturing-heavy regions in
the US. The chapter shows that manufacturing shares strongly predict dampened
house price growth, mechanically contributing to a rise in housing wealth inequality
vi
across regions. However, this price growth difference is particularly strong for lower-
priced houses, amplifying inequality within regions as well. Overall, I find that cross-
sectional house price inequality has increased by around 10%, with around a third of
this increase due to the relative decline of lower-value homes.
In the third chapter, I combine empirical tools and structural modeling to measure
the effect of monetary policy on consumption through housing. Exploiting quarterly
US data, I estimate empirically that a 1% unexpected interest rate shock causes
average house prices to drop by about 1.4% in two years. Feeding this empirical
response into an incomplete markets model, I find that aggregate consumption shifts
by around 0.3% in response to the shock. A lean-against-the-wind monetary policy
can stabilize consumption dynamics along a transition path.
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Growth in China: the Role of Capital
Upgrading
Abstract
In rich microdata, I document that Chinese firms often simultaneously fire workers
while investing in capital. After such capital substitution episodes, firm labor
productivity increases, labor share drops, and skill intensity increases. A model in
which firms adopt new skill-intensive technology through investment in capital
upgrading naturally rationalizes each of these facts, linking capital substitution
events to technological change. Empirically, trade liberalization shocks reduce
capital substitution at Chinese firms, raising the possibility that trade liberalization
may delay short-run growth. In light of these facts, I build a quantitative general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, capital upgrading through substitution
events, and trade liberalization shocks. After liberalization, strategically delayed
capital upgrading by firms pushes technological and consumption gains further into
the future, expanding the horizon over which trade gains manifest themselves.
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1.1 Introduction
Trade liberalization expanded the market for Chinese firms’ output. If affected firms
also changed their technology in a different manner, then trade liberalization might
have altered the path of overall Chinese growth. In this paper, I examine this topic
through the lens of firms’ adoption of capital and skill intensive equipment, which
I refer to as capital upgrading. I document that trade liberalization shocks cause a
temporary slow down in the frequency of capital upgrading. I then construct a quan-
titative heterogeneous firm general equilibrium model to rationalize this finding. The
model shows that the deceleration in capital upgrading after liberalization postpones
growth in aggregate consumption by a significant margin.
I first propose to measure capital upgrading indirectly through a peculiar joint
factor adjustment pattern in which firms simultaneously invest in capital and shed
labor, which I will henceforth refer to as capital substitution episodes (or capital sub-
stitution for short). Capital substitution is difficult to rationalize in standard macro
models, such as Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions with standard param-
eters (Dixit, 1997; Hawkins et al., 2015). However, such episodes prove prevalent
and economically significant in the data. I show that capital substitution episodes
account for around 15% of all firm-year observations in Chinese manufacturing mi-
crodata between 1999 and 2007 and that they also contribute to about one quarter
of aggregate capital formation and around two fifths of aggregate job destruction by
incumbent firms, highlighting its economic significance. These results are consistent
with similar findings in Korean data (Hawkins et al., 2015).
More importantly, both micro and macro empirical evidence support the idea that
capital substitution episodes are generated by firms firing low skill workers when up-
grading their capital stock. By exploiting firm level data, I document that firms on
average have persistently higher average productivity and lower labor share follow-
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ing capital substitution episodes. Using provincial aggregate series, I also document
a strong positive correlation between the frequency of capital substitution and the
growth in the share of skilled labor at the province level, indicating that investment
made in capital substitution episodes are more skill intensive.
I then examine the impact of trade liberalization on capital upgrading via capital
substitution and document a temporary drop in the substitution frequency after lib-
eralization. I adopt an instrumentation strategy similar to that in D. H. Autor et al.
(2013). The instrument is a shift-share measure that exploits the heterogeneity in ex
ante local industry composition as well as the remarkably fast growing but hetero-
geneous demand for Chinese manufacturing goods across industries. As illustrated
in Figure 1·1, the Chinese manufacturing sector saw a rapid growth in aggregate
exports at an annualized rate of 25.73% in the six years after China’s WTO acces-
sion. Crucially, substantial variation across industries exists, as represented by the
interquantile range of accumulated growth at 4-digit industry level in the blue ribbon.
I aggregate the heterogeneous demand using initial local industry composition to cre-
ate my instrument for local exposure to foreign demand. A rise in demand due to
trade liberalization results in a robust drop in the frequency of capital substitution.
The identification strategy differs from those of previous studies with a similar context
that relied on tariff reductions (Brandt et al., 2017) or the uncertainty in trade policy
(Cheng & Potlogea, 2015; Pierce & Schott, 2016). To the best of my knowledge, the
documented slowdown in capital upgrading is the first to extend the study of the im-
pact of trade on technology adoption to short-run dynamics, complementing previous
studies in the trade literature, both empirical (Fuentes, Gilchrist, et al., 2005; Bustos,
2011; Bloom et al., 2016) and theoretical (Bustos, 2011; Stoyanov, 2013; Perla et al.,
2015), which have mainly focused on long run gains.
To rationalize the empirical facts, I first show that a simple model with a standard
5
Figure 1·1: Quick and Heterogeneous Growth of Chinese Exports by
Industry
Note: Nominal aggregate exports of manufacturing firms in log calculated from firm level micro
data, with base year set in 2001, the year of China’s accession to WTO. The blue ribbon represents
the inter-quantile range of exports growth across 4-digit industries.
CES production function and two special assumptions, vintage capital and learning-
by-doing, is able to generate capital upgrading events that appear as capital substi-
tution episodes. The reason why capital substitution episodes are hard to generate
with conventional macro production functions is because they lack sufficient substi-
tutability between capital and labor. To generate capital substitution in a standard
CES production function, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
would have to be more than 4 (Hawkins et al., 2015), much larger than standard
estimates of less than 2 (Krusell et al., 2000). My model provides extra substitutabil-
ity through its unique structure and hence does not rely on extreme values of the
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elasticity of substitution. In particular, the vintage capital assumption differentiates
capital by its vintage (an iPhone 4 vs an iPhone 11) and requires the productivity
of each vintage be fixed at the time of its launch, as is standard in the technology
diffusion literature (Chari & Hopenhayn, 1991; D. A. Comin et al., 2012; D. Comin &
Mestieri, 2014) and the literature that studies investment decisions in the presence of
capital vintages (Barucci & Gozzi, 1998, 2001; Feichtinger et al., 2006). As a result,
capital augmenting technology rises after a firm updates its vintage, with the magni-
tude endogenously determined by the new vintage choice and initial vintage position.
The learning-by-doing assumption is a parsimonious choice to generate the opposite
adjustment in the labor augmenting technology following a capital upgrading event.
Low skill workers accumulate vintage specific human capital while working but lose it
when the firm switches to a new vintage. So a firm upgrading its capital finds it opti-
mal to fire low skill workers whose productivity with the new vintage is low, causing
opposite labor adjustment without a high elasticity of substitution. My simple model
qualitatively matches observed correlation between capital substitution episodes and
increases in average labor productivity, drops in the labor share, and increases in skill
intensity.
I then extend the simple model to a quantitative heterogeneous firm general equi-
librium model that inherits its basic structure from the lumpy investment literature
(Cooper & Haltiwanger, 2006; Khan & Thomas, 2008; Winberry, 2016; Bloom et al.,
2018) and solve the model using computationally intensive techniques. I calibrate
the quantitative model to micro moments from initial years of the sample and then
consider an unexpected demand shock that replicates the trade liberalization. The
dynamic model is able to reproduce the drop in the frequency of capital substitution
upon impact of the demand shock quantitatively well. The drop in the frequency
of capital substitution, and the underlying capital upgrading, stems from strategic
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waiting. Anticipating demand to continue to grow into the future, some firms which
were expecting to upgrade delay their plans so as to be technologically well equipped
when demand fully realizes later. This strategic waiting mechanism is similar to that
studied in Feichtinger et al. (2006) but differs in that mine is induced by anticipated
rising demand rather than anticipated technological progress. Comparing the bench-
mark model to a counterfactual one without the strategic waiting motive shows that
strategic waiting postpones consumption gains by a significant margin, reducing con-
sumption by about 3% in year 4 and increasing consumption by 3% in year 10 after
the demand shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 establishes the impor-
tance of capital substitution in the data. Section 1.3 examines the dynamic response
of capital substitution to trade liberalization. Section 1.4 and 1.5 build models to
rationalize the empirical findings and link capital substitution to capital upgrading.
Section 1.6 evaluates the quantitative performance of the full model and conducts
counterfactual analysis. Section 1.7 concludes. The appendix includes details on the
data and empirical approaches (A.1), proof of propositions (A.2), and the quantitative
model (A.3).
1.2 Facts about Capital Substitution
1.2.1 Data
The major data source is China Database of Above-Scaled Industrial Firms , a firm
level database that covers about 70% of the total industrial value added in China and
contains rich firm level information such as geographical and industrial identifiers
and financial accounts. The cleaned data is a large unbalanced panel with about 1.8
million firm-year observations that spans 1998-2007, 31 provincial level administrative
regions (henceforth referred to as provinces) and 425 4-digit industries. The perpetual
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inventory method is used to calculate the real capital stock for each firm, and firm
aggregate employment is directly observed. More details about the data used can be
found in Appendix A.1.1
1.2.2 Definition of Capital Substitution Episodes
As aforementioned, I define capital substitution as a joint factor adjustment episode
where a firm invests in capital while reducing the total number of workers. Mathe-
matically, I calculate measures of the investment rate and employment growth rate,
and define capital substitution episodes as firm-year observations in which the invest-
ment rate is positive and the employment growth rate is negative and in which each
of the adjustment rate must exceeds their respective threshold in magnitude.
To be precise, I calculate the Davis-Haltiwanger style (Davis & Haltiwanger, 1992)
investment rates and employment growth rates according to Equation 1.1, with kt
representing the real capital stock at time t, lt the total number of employees, and δ
the deprecation of capital.12 I plot the joint distribution of gk,t and gl,t of incumbent
firms (excluding entries and exits) in Figure 1·2 in which the darkness of each small
square is proportional to its density in logs. There are many firm-year observations
in the bottom right quadrant, with firms investing in capital and reducing their labor
employment at the same time, i.e. capital substitution episodes.3
1Such a measure yields similar numbers to the simple growth or log growth rates when the
absolute value is around zero, but is less prone to extreme values, with the upper limit capped at 2,
representing entry, and lower limit at -2, representing exit.
2Here and later in the model calibration, I use δ = 0.09, which is broadly consistent with the
average ratio of current depreciation to total accumulated depreciation in the data.
3In the baseline case, I apply thresholds on the factor adjustment rates so as to avoid measurement
errors. The thresholds are defined as percentages of the interquantile range (IQR) of respective
adjustment rates with location, industry and year heterogeneity taken into account when calculated.
The baseline choice is in line with previous practice in the literature as in Hawkins et al. (2015). The
gaps in the upper panel of Figure 1·2 represent the thresholds. Empirical results in the following
sections are robust to the choice of thresholds.
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gk,t =2
kt − (1− δ) kt−1





For convenience, I assign names to observations in other quadrants as well. Ob-
servations in the top right quadrant, where firms invest in capital and increase the
number of workers, are referred to as expansion episodes. Those in the top left as
labor substitution, and those in the bottom left as shrinkage.
1.2.3 Importance of Capital Substitution
Capital substitution is both prevalent in number and economically significant in terms
of contribution to aggregate factor adjustments. Capital substitution is the second
most frequently observed joint factor adjustments in the data. The lower panel in fig-
ure 1·2 shows the probability densities of the four types of joint factor adjustments in
the sample. Capital substitution episodes represent approximately 15% of firm-year
observations by incumbent firms, second only to expansion episodes but are substan-
tially more prevalent than the other two types. Note that there are far more capital
substitution episodes than their opposite, labor substitution episodes, a pattern that
is robust and consistent over the years in the sample.
Capital substitution also accounts for a significant portion of aggregate factor ad-
justments. Figure 1·3 shows that almost a quarter of aggregate capital formation and
two fifths of gross job destruction by incumbent firms take place in capital substitution
episodes. To put the numbers into scale, the left panel in Figure 1·3 compares capital
substitution to expansion episodes in terms of contribution to aggregate capital for-
mation. The contribution of capital substitution is about half of that by expansion.
Similarly, according to the right panel, the contribution to gross job destruction by
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capital substitution doubles that by shrinkage.
1.2.4 Capital Substitution as an Indirect Measure of Capital Upgrading
Capital substitution is prevalent and economically significant, but in this subsection
I push further and demonstrate that capital substitution appears to be a good proxy
for capital upgrading, i.e. adoption of more productive equipment that is capital and
skill intensive.
Starting with firm level evidence, Figure 1·4 depicts the average log change of
a set of firm level measures around a capital substitution episode. The horizontal
axis represents number of years away from a capital substitution episode. The log
differences are estimated jointly using firm level data that takes into account time,
location and industry heterogeneity, and the blue ribbon represents the 95% confi-
dence intervals for the estimates, with standard errors clustered at the province level.
Details about the underlying regression can be found in Appendix A.1.2. The first
row shows results for capital and employment. Because of the definition of capital
substitution, it is mechanical that capital increases and employment drops at time 0.
Rise in Labor Productivity
The left panel in the second row of Figure 1·4 depicts the rise in average labor produc-
tivity. Following a capital substitution episode, average labor productivity measured
by real sales over number of workers increases by about 20 log points. On the other
hand, the average wage rises sharply as well as shown in the right panel in the sec-
ond row. These changes are consistent with change in the composition of the firm
employment that favors more productive (skilled) workers.
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Drop in Labor Share
The panel in the third row of Figure 1·4 depicts the persistent drop in labor share.
Following a capital substitution episode, the labor share measured by total payroll
over total sales drops by about 5 log points, on top of a pre-existing downward trend.
The increase in capital intensity happens despite the fact that average worker becomes
more productive. Krusell et al. (2000) suggest that capital complements skilled labor
but substitutes unskilled labor. Given this assumption, one possible explanation for
the drop in labor share is that new investment in capital substitution episodes is more
productive than the firm’s old capital stock.
Overall, the firm level evidence is consistent with firms shedding low-productivity
(unskilled) workers and adopting more productive equipment that complements high-
productivity (skilled) workers. Unfortunately, I do not directly observe the skill of
workers at the firm level. Therefore, I reply on aggregate data to show capital sub-
stitution being positively correlated with rise in skill intensity.
Rise in Skill Intensity
The left panel in Figure 1·5 captures the positive correlation between labor skill
intensity and capital substitution at province level. Specifically, I plot in the left
panel the change in the share of skilled labor in one province against the frequency of
firms in that province conducting capital substitution across the 31 provinces.4 The
left panel shows a clear and significantly positive correlation, i.e. the more frequent
firms conduct capital substitution in one province the more skilled workers those
firms hire. As comparison, the right panel of Figure 1·5 plots the change in the share
of skilled labor to the frequency of expansion which is negatively correlated. This
4The share of skilled labor is a shift-share variant that controls for the initial local industrial
composition and is measured between 2004 and 2008. The frequency of capital substitution is aggre-
gated from firm level indicators using initial employment to the province level for 2004. Appendix
A.1.2 details the construction of the data series.
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comparison reveals that new investment in capital substitution episodes are indeed
particularly skill intensive.
In a nutshell, these findings justifies my claim that capital substitution is a proper
measure of capital upgrading. I use a simple model to rationalize these facts in Section
1.4. But before doing so, I first examine the empirical dynamic response of capital
substitution to rising demand from trade liberalization in the next section.
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Figure 1·2: Firms Often Invest in Capital and Fire Workers Simulta-
neously
Note: Upper panel. Horizontal axis: Davis-Haltiwanger style investment rate; vertical axis:
Davis-Haliwanger style employment growth rate. In the baseline case, I apply thresholds on the
factor adjustment rates so as to avoid measurement errors. The thresholds are defined as
percentages of the interquantile range (IQR) of respective adjustment rates with location, industry
and year heterogeneity taken into account when calculated. The baseline choice is in line with
previous practice in the literature as in Hawkins et al. (2015). Empirical results are robust to the
choice of thresholds. Lower Panel. Sample frequency of each of the four types of joint factor
adjustments, pooled from the panel, weighted by current employment. Expansion is defined as
firm-year observations in which the firm invests in capital and hires labor, with the factor
adjustment rates above certain thresholds (similar for the rest); shrinkage is defined as firm-year
observations in which the firm divests capital and sheds labor; capital substitution as those in
which the firm invests in capital and sheds labor; labor substitution as those in which the firm
divests capital and hires workers.
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Figure 1·3: Capital Substitution Accounts for a Major Portion of
Aggregate Factor Adjustments
Note: Contribution to aggregate factor adjustmentsby incumbent firms. Capital accumulation is
defined as positive change in real capital stock net of depreciation, and job destruction as negative
change in number of employees, following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). Expansion is defined as
firm-year observations in which the firm invests in capital and hires labor, with the factor
adjustment rates above certain thresholds (similar for the rest); shrinkage is defined as firm-year
observations in which the firm divests capital and sheds labor; capital substitution as those in
which the firm invests in capital and sheds labor; labor substitution as those in which the firm
divests capital and hires workers.
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Figure 1·4: Capital Substitution, Labor Productivity, and the Labor
Share
Note: Average log change from the values at a capital substitution episode. The horizontal axis
indicates number of years away from a capital substitution episode at 0. The vertical axis
represents the log difference. Blue ribbons correspond to 95% confidence intervals with the
standard errors grouped at province level. Capital is real capital stock calculated from perpetual
inventory method. Employment is number of employees directly from the data. Payroll/sales
measures aggregate labor share at the firm level, and are all in nominal. Real sales /workers
proxies average labor productivity, and real sales is defined as nominal sales relative to average
sales of firms belonging to the same 4-digit industry nation wide.
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Figure 1·5: Capital Substitution and Labor Skill Intensity
Note: Left panel, percentage change in skill composition of labor force (vertical axis) over the
frequency of capital substitution (horizontal axis) over provinces. The fitted line has a coefficient
of 0.032, t-stat 2.89, and adj R2 0.20. Right panel, percentage change in skill composition of labor
force (vertical axis) over the frequency of expansion (horizontal axis) over provinces. The fitted
line has a coefficient of -0.020, t-stat -3.40, and adj R2 0.26.
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1.3 Capital Substitution and Trade Liberalization
In this section, I examine the response of capital upgrading behavior of Chinese
firms to rising demand from trade liberalization following China’s accession to WTO
through the lens of capital substitution. To address endogeneity, I adopt a shift-
share instrumentation approach adapted from D. H. Autor et al. (2013). I exploit the
heterogeneity in industry composition at 4-digit level across time, location and sector
to study the impact of increased foreign demand on Chinese goods on the behavior
of local Chinese firms. I refer to this instrument as the “trade shock instrument”.
1.3.1 Trade Shock Instrument
The trade shock instrument is also broadly known as the Bartik instrument (Bar-
tik, 1991; Blanchard et al., 1992; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018). In this paper, I
construct my trade shock instrument at the province-by-sector level at yearly basis.
The consideration is threefold. First and foremost, this aggregation incorporates the
rich heterogeneity across both geography dimension and industry dimension. Indeed,
apart from differences in natural endowments, such as distance to nearest port that
proxies transportation costs, there are vast regional heterogeneity due to local poli-
cies. Industry wise, the reduction in export tariffs as a result of WTO accession is
heterogeneous across industries (Pierce & Schott, 2016; Brandt et al., 2017). In ad-
dition, by explicitly controlling for heterogeneity in sectors, I only reply on variations
within province-by-sector cells for my results. Moreover, avoiding measurement errors
is the major rationale for not moving into more disaggregated levels. There are many
firms moving across prefectures or changing its industry at the 4-digit level (Brandt
et al., 2014), but rarely so across provinces or at the 2-digit sector level.
Essentially, the trade shock instrument measures the aggregate local exports pre-
dicted by initial local industry composition. In details, I take the following steps to
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construct the trade shock instrument. I first group the firms into province-by-sector
cells. Among each cell, I calculate the shares as the employment share 5 of each
4-digit industry belonging to that cell in the year 1998, the first year of my sample6.
The shifts, which are meant to capture the aggregate component of local exports, are
annual national aggregate real exports at 4-digit industry levels, yet leaving out local
contributions. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) point out that such so-called Leave-
One-Out (LOO) series have better empirical performance. The formal expression of
the instrument is given in Equation 1.2. Bp,s,t is the shift-share (B stands for Bartik)
instrument in province p, sector s and year t. µj,p,s is the employment share of 4-digit
industry j constituting sector s in province p in the year 1998. And LOOj,p,t is the
leave-one-out national export series of industry j excluding the contribution by the





I use the instrument to address endogeneity problem of the main regressor, which
is the cell level aggregate real exports in log. The regression is estimated using initial
employment of each cell in 1998 as cell weights, and this is true for all other regressions
unless otherwise noted. The first stage is given in Table 1.1, with a F-stat of over
thirty, strongly rejecting the null that the instrument is irrelevant.
5The choice of employment share is again to minimize measurement errors. Employment is
exactly measured, so there is no additional measurement errors introduced with the use of deflators,
as in the case of real exports or real sales. Moreover, the choice of the aggregation level for the
cells also ensure that firms in each cell are comparable enough so that using employment share does
not favor labor intensive industries. As a robustness check, replacing the employment share with
exports share or sales share does not alter the main results in a qualitative way.
6For example, a cell is the furniture sector in Beijing, and the shares are the employment shares













Table 1.1: Strong First Stage
Note: S.E. in parentheses, clustered at province level; star levels: * ¡ 0.1, ** ¡ 0.05, *** ¡ 0.01; fixed
effects include year fixed effect, cell fixed effect and linear cell time trends which appear as cell
fixed effects in log differences; IQR:y(x) represents the inter-quantile range for the dependent
(independent) variable. Log(exports) is the log of total real exports by all firms in a
province-by-sector-by-year cell; Bartik is the trade shock instrument.
1.3.2 Benchmark Regression
To incorporate as many observations as possible and to reduce measurement error, I
aggregate firm data up to the province-by-sector level at yearly basis, with current
employment as weights. The benchmark regression takes the form in Equation 1.3.
On the right hand side is the log of aggregate real exports by all firms in each province-
sector cell in year t which captures the foreign demand through trade and is taken
three year difference of as represented by ∆3. There are also a set of fixed effects
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, namely a non-parametric time fixed effect
δt , a province-by-sector linear time trend captured by δp,s and a standard province-
by-sector fixed effect that have been differenced out. On the left hand side, there are
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an assortment of cell level measures in three year differences. Of main interest among
them is the frequency of capital substitution.
∆3yp,s,t = ∆3xp,s,tβ + δp,s + δt + εp,s,t (1.3)
Table 1.2 shows results for the frequency measure under various specifications.
The first column presents the OLS results for the current frequency of capital substi-
tution7. Both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, the OLS coefficient
is very close to zero. In comparison, the second column shows the benchmark IV re-
sult, a statistically significant and negative value. The IV coefficient is economically
significant too. “IQR: y” and “IQR: x” represent the inter-quantile range for the de-
pendent variable and independent variable respectively. Put together, the IV result
implies that the variation in three-year growth of local aggregate exports accounts for
around 180% the reduction in three change of the current frequency of capital sub-
stitution, which corresponds to -115% reduction relative to the sample mean. The
comparison between the OLS and IV results is consistent with the existence of local
unobservables that bias the coefficient towards zero, for instance, local productivity
shocks that boost both exports and capital upgrading.
The result in Column 2 of Table 1.2 is robust. Column 3 replicates the IV re-
sult dropping out a selection of labor intensive industries, including textile, leather
making, furniture and toy making industries, which are all large exporters during the
sample period. Again, the coefficient is statistically significant and is even larger in
magnitude though not statistically distinguishable from the benchmark IV. Result in
column 3 indicates that the slow down of capital substitution in response to trade
liberalization is not driven by labor intensive industries, but rather a unanimous phe-
7This frequency is calculated as the weighted mean of an indicator variable, which equals one if
the firm is observed to conduct capital substitution in that year, with current employment of the
firm as weights.
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nomenon across all industries. Column 4 also employs the benchmark IV strategy but
with equal weights for all cells instead of employment weights. The estimation loses
some power, indicating that the reduction in capital substitution frequency is more
likely driven by large cells than by small ones. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient
is quantitatively similar. Finally, Column 6 examines the persistence of the reduction
in capital substitution by replacing the LHS variable with a different measure. The
new measure is the sample frequency of firms taking capital substitution in the next
three years for each cell8. Again, higher exposure to the trade liberalization, fewer
capital upgradings take place in the near future. Lastly, it is useful to point out that
the benchmark regression, together with the frequency measures, takes the form of a
linear probability model. For the purpose of obtaining average treatment effect, this
model would suffice. Nonetheless, the results are still robust if I switch to Logit or
Tobit model.
8i.e. it is the weighted average of an indicator which equals one if a firm is observed to conduct
capital substitution in year t+ 1 to t+ 3 up until the end of the sample
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OLS IV IV Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(C.S.) Pr(C.S.) Pr(C.S.) Pr(C.S.)
log(Exports) -0.0030 -0.26*** -0.31*** -0.22**
(0.0055) (0.088) (0.11) (0.094)
Cluster Province Province Province Province
FE: Yr, Cell, Trend Yr, Cell, Trend Yr, Cell, Trend Yr, Cell, Trend
Weights Emp Emp Emp None
IQR: y 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12
IQR: x 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.82
N obs 3666 3666 3042 3666
Table 1.2: Second Stage, Foreign Demand Slows Down Capital Sub-
stitution
Note: S.E. in parentheses, clustered at province level; star levels: * ¡ 0.1, ** ¡ 0.05, *** ¡ 0.01; fixed
effects include year fixed effect, cell fixed effect and linear cell time trends which appear as cell
fixed effects in log differences; IQR:y(x) represents the inter-quantile range for the dependent
(independent) variable. Pr(C.S.) is the probability of observing a firm conduct Capital Upgrading
in a province-by-sector-by-year cell. 3y Pr(C.S.) is the probability of observing a firm conduct
Capital Upgrading in the next three years; log(exports) is the log of total real exports by all firms
in a province-by-sector-by-year cell which is instrumented by the Bartik.
1.4 Simple Model
The facts in Section 1.2 suggest that capital substitution may be driven by capital
upgrading behavior of firms. In this section, I use a standard CES production function
extended with two features, vintage capital and learning-by-doing, to rationalize the
facts. The two assumptions capture the notion of capital upgrading and are essential
to generate capital substitution episodes in the model. Therefore, I’d like to discuss
them before moving into the technical details.
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1.4.1 Vintage Capital and Learning-by-Doing
Vintage capital is a form of capital heterogeneity such that different vintages are em-
bedded with different productivities. An informal example would be that an iPhone
11 is faster than an iPhone 4. The majority of the macro literature assumes ho-
mogeneity in capital (Aiyagari, 1994; Christiano et al., 2005; Cooper & Haltiwanger,
2006; Khan & Thomas, 2008). Investments made across the years are pooled together
after depreciation and benefit in the same way from any technology improvement. It’s
as if to say when Apple makes a new generation of A series CPU, all the old iPhone
models suddenly become equally faster as the newest one that actually has the new
generation chip installed. While being a useful assumption to keep tractability, the
homogeneous capital assumption becomes too much an abstraction when data point
to heterogeneity in capital. In this model, I explicitly account for this heterogeneity
in the form of vintages. Each vintage is embedded with the then latest technology
when launched and technology improvement only benefits the latest vintage, not the
older ones. This assumption introduces a realistic form of technology rigidity into the
economy.
Learning-by-doing is a parsimonious assumption to capture the idea that a new
vintage is more intensive in skill labor than the old ones without changing the produc-
tion function. It reflects the idea that unskilled workers accumulate vintage specific
human capital while working. There are two important implications. First, the pro-
ductivity of unskilled workers grows over time as they keep working with a vintage.
Second, they would loose the productivity once the firm decides to switch to a differ-
ent vintage. With reasonable parameter choices in which capital complements skilled
labor and substitutes the unskilled (Krusell et al., 2000), it is mechanical that firms
would increase skilled labor hiring and shed unskilled labor when upgrading their
vintages. Note that under this assumption, a capital substitution episode would be
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observed if the number of unskilled workers shed is large enough when a firm upgrades
its vintage.
1.4.2 Model Setup
Consider a partial equilibrium economy where three production factors, skilled la-
bor, unskilled labor and capital, are elastically supplied at prices WH,t, WL,t and
Rt respectively. The production side consists of a unit continuum of monopolistic
competitive firms that have nested CES production technology (Equation 1.4), are
subject to downward-sloping iso-elastic demand curves (Equation 1.5), and are ex
ante identical but ex post heterogeneous due to idiosyncratic demand shocks (Equa-
tion 1.6). I abstract from firm subscript and make simplification assumptions that
capital and skilled labor are absolute complement and the elasticity of substitution
between capital and unskilled labor σ is greater than 1. Aggregate demand is denoted
by Yf,t and is exogenous, whereas the aggregate price level that would have appeared






















log zt = σzνt (1.6)
Time is discrete, and each vintage is indexed by its age τ which is the number of
years since its launch. A firm can only have one vintage at a time, denoted by τ for
reasons to be discussed shortly. ζX,t (τ) , X ∈ {K,L} represent capital / unskilled la-
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bor productivities, or factor augmenting technologies, and are deterministic functions
of τ . Each period, a firm is free to choose the amount of each production factor to
employ. I assume Calvo (Calvo, 1983) style staggered adjustment of vintages. Each
period, a firm has probability µ to be able to choose its vintage τ , and has probability
1− τ to have to keep its old vintage. If able to, the firm can choose from countably
infinite number of vintages that have been launched. That is τ ′ ∈ N , with τ ′ = 0
representing the vintage that is just launched. If forbidden to choose, the vintage
ages one more year, i.e. τ ′ = τ + 1.
Assumption 1. Define µL,τ =
F(0)





< ασ (κWH + PK)
1−σ (µσK,τ − 1) ∀τ
There is an exogenously constant growing world technology frontier with growth
speed ξK,1 (Equation 1.7). As aforementioned, capital is the medium of technology
and vintage’s productivity is fixed to the technology level at the time of its launch
(Equation 1.8a). Given Assumption 1, a firm will always choose the latest vintage,
i.e. τ ′ = 0, whenever able to do so. This assumption essentially ensures that the
marginal cost of production is the lowest if the firm chooses to use the newest vintage
irrespective of its current vintage. As a result, the number of years unskilled workers
have worked with a vintage corresponds to its age. The (unskilled) labor productivity
ζL,t (τ) thus can be written as a deterministic function of τ (Equation 1.8b). Function
F (τ) is increasing and concave in τ , increasing in the sense that learning accumulates
human capital and concave in the sense that marginal return to learning is dimin-
ishing. The assumption that labor productivity is pegged to the world technology






ζL,t (τ) =ζA,tF (τ)
(1.8)
1.4.3 Solution






where i indexes the firms which have been omitted so far,
and factor augmenting technologies {ζK,t, ζL,t}t. I use lower letters to represent the
standardized variables, and, with some abuse of notation, to represent the variables
that do not need to be standardized as well ({Pt, Kt, Ht,Mt, Lt}t). The equilibrium of
the model can be characterized by nine equations. Four from the first order condition
of the profit maximization problem of the firms, two from the constraints of said
problem, three for the evolution of exogenous variables {zt, ζk, ζl}t and one for the
evolution of the distribution of firms over state space τ ≥ 0.
Definition 2. An equilibrium of the economy is defined as policy functions of {y, p, k, h, l}
and a distribution of firms over τ , such that given
prices {wH,t, wL,t, rt}t, aggregate demand {yf,t}t, idiosyncratic state {zt, τ} and factor
augmenting technologies {ζk, ζl}
1. the firms maximize their profits each period;
2. the evolution of the distribution of firms is consistent with the Calvo setting.
Suppose {wH,t, wL,t, rt, yf,t}t are time invariant, then there exists a balanced growth
path for the economy in the sense that normalized aggregate allocations stay constant
over time. Firms in the balanced growth path follow a geometric distribution along
the τ dimension.
1.4.4 Capital Substitution in the Balanced Growth Path
Consider a representative firm in the balanced growth path. For easy presentation,
I abstract from firm index i and time subscript t. Define capital substitution as
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joint factor adjustments where ∆k > 0 and ∆n < 0 with n = h + l being the
total employment, which is what I observe in the data. Demand for the production
factors are given by Equation 1.9, where λ is the marginal cost of production that is
determined by factor prices and productivities. Without special structures in {ζk, ζl}
put forth by the two special assumptions, demand shocks in this model are Hicks-
neutral and would only result in symmetric same-direction factor adjustments through
y. To obtain capital substitution, one would need both factor augmenting technology














Suppose the firm has just upgraded its vintage. Comparing to itself in the previous
period, the firm has changes in the factor composition that come from the change in
factor augmenting technologies {ζk, ζl} and the demand shifter z. Obviously, ∆ζk > 0
because firms always update to the newest and most productive vintage and ∆ζl < 0
because the human capital of the unskilled to the last vintage is lost. The following
proposition establishes the existence of capital substitution in the model.
Proposition 3. If the probability measure of ν is strictly above 0 for any real number,
then for ∀τ ≥ 0, there exists positive measure of firms with vintage τ that exhibits
capital substitution when they upgrade their vintage. The fraction of firms exhibiting
capital substitution conditional on having vintage τ is strictly increasing in τ .
The proof is given in Appendix A.2.The intuition for the existence of capital
substitution is pretty simple. When upgrading its vintage, a firm is affected in its
factor choices through two channels: the scale channel and the substitution channel.
The scale channel is composed of the effect of z through y and the effect of ∆ζx, x ∈
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{k, l} through λ. The substitution channel comes from ∆ζx, x ∈ {k, l} directly. The
substitution channel alone would result in positive investment and unskilled labor
shedding. The complication is that skilled labor also increases as capital does. Since
the demand shifter can take any real values, there must exists value of ν such that
the scale effect is negative, the overall change in capital is marginally positive, so
does the change in skilled labor, and the overall change in the unskilled becomes even
more negative. Such firms exhibit capital substitution.
1.4.5 Matching the Model to the Data
There are three sets of facts that are related to capital substitution in Section 1.2. Fact
1, average labor productivity increases for firms that conduct capital substitution.
Fact 2, firms that conduct capital substitution on average have decreases in their
labor shares. Fact 3, the frequency of capital substitution is positively correlated to
the growth in skilled labor composition. The following proposition reveals that the
simple model matches all three facts qualitatively.
Proposition 4. In the balanced growth path of the simple model,
1. a firm has strictly higher sales per worker following a capital upgrade for
∀τ ν & ν ′ if and only if wH + rκ > wL;
2. a firm has strictly lower labor share following a capital upgrade for ∀ previous
vintage τ , previous demand shock ν and new demand shock ν ′;
3. composition of skilled labor in the aggregate labor force strictly rises in the
frequency of capital upgrading µ.
Again, the proof is given in Appendix A.2, and I briefly describe the intuition here.
The average sales per worker strictly increases as long as the marginal cost of skilled
labor is strictly higher than that for the unskilled. Note that due to the Dixit-Stiglitz
demand function, a firm’s markup is constant, so higher sales per worker translates to
higher average cost per worker. Then the condition becomes clear in that it requires
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the marginal cost of the skilled be higher than that of the unskilled. This is trivially
true if wH ≥ wL.
Firms have lower labor share after upgrading capital. Due to the Leontief assump-
tion for k and h, if there were no unskilled labor in the production, the labor share
would be fixed as both the prices and the capital to skilled labor ratio are fixed. With
nonzero unskilled labor, the labor share would be strictly higher than the otherwise
fixed number. Also note that the higher the capital to unskilled labor ratio, the lower
the labor share. Following a capital upgrade, the ratio between capital and unskilled
labor strictly increases, and hence the labor share drops.
Capital upgrading leads to higher skilled labor composition in the model. The fre-
quency of capital substitution is mainly governed by the Calvo probability of vintage
upgrading µ. Since firms have higher skilled to unskilled labor ratio after upgrading
vintage, it follows naturally that the higher the frequency of vintage upgrading, the
higher the frequency of capital substitution, and the higher the proportion of skilled
labor in the labor force.
All in all, the simple model is able to match the static facts documented in the data
remarkably well without the need to add any substantial assumptions, reinforcing the
idea that capital substitution is generated by firms upgrading their capital. The next
section expands the model to a dynamic setting to account for the dynamic response
of capital substitution to the trade liberalization.
1.5 Quantitative Model
To account for the deceleration of capital substitution in response to demand shock
as observed in the data, I build a heterogeneous firm general equilibrium model in
this section that inherits the main settings in Section 1.4. The model differs from the
simple one in Section 1.4 in that it endogenizes the capital and wage prices, makes
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capital stock an idiosyncratic state variable, and more importantly, endogenizes the
capital upgrading decision. In addition, as is standard in the lumpy investment
literature, I introduce both convex and nonconvex capital adjustment cost as well as
nonconvex cost to capital upgrading.
1.5.1 Household
There is a representative household with additive log utility for consumption and
CRRA utilities for heterogeneous labor supplies. The flow utility is given in Equation
1.10, which belongs to the KPR (King et al., 1988) utility family to facilitate the
existence of a balanced growth path. Consistent with notation choice in Section 1.4,
I use capital letters to denote variables in levels, and small letters to denote variables
normalized by the world technology technology frontier.







The household’s income comes from labor incomes, dividend income from own-
ership of the firms and the interest income from a safe asset of zero net supply in
equilibrium. There is the natural borrowing constraint to prevent Ponzi Games. For-
mally,
C +B′ = WHH +WLL+D +BR (1.11)
1.5.2 Final Goods Firm
There is a representative final goods firm that produces the final good by aggregating
intermediate goods using a standard Dixit-Stiglitz style CES aggregator with type
specific demand shifters. This generates the downward-sloping and iso-elastic demand










where Yf is the aggregate demand and Pf is an aggregate price index which is
normalized to be one from now on.9 zi is the good specific demand shifter, which
follows an AR(1) Gaussian process in logs, (νi ∼iid N(0, 1)). To the extent that the
intermediate goods are substitutes, i.e. ε > 1, the idiosyncratic demand is increasing
in the demand shifter.
log zi = ρzzi,−1 + σzνi (1.13)
1.5.3 Intermediate Goods Firms
There is a unit continuum of ex ante identical intermediate goods firms which are
ex post heterogeneous due to idiosyncratic demand shocks νi as in 1.13. Each firm
retains its own capital, and hires skilled and unskilled labor to produce a intermediate
good using the same production function as in Equation 1.4. Since I endogenize the
investment and vintage choice (capital upgrading) decision, the intermediate firms
need to solve a dynamic problem on top of the static profit maximization problem. I
now discuss the two problems in turn.
Static Profit-Maximizing Problem
The intermediate firms are price takers in the factor markets with a nested CES





























To simplify the problem, I assume firms always make full use of their capital
stock. This assumption effectively restricts the choice of skilled labor to be H = κK,
where κ can be interpreted as the efficiency of capital relative to skilled labor. This
assumption deprives the firms of their ability to adjust utilization of their capital stock
by choosing H, but has minimal effect on the main intuition. Due to the assumption,
the static choice problem can be formulated as follows,
max
L,K,P,Y














The solution can be obtained by solving a Lagrangian and is characterized by
Equation 1.16. Price is a fixed markup times marginal cost of production λ. Marginal
cost of production is proportional to the efficiency adjusted price of the only factor
choice, unskilled labor, and is decreasing in capital stock K̄. As a result, one of the
trade-offs firms face when making dynamic investment problem is the reduction in
marginal cost vs. the increase in “fixed cost”, −κK̄WH . Three unknowns and three




























I introduced the factor augmenting technologies in Section 1.4.2, which are determin-
istic functions of the vintage that are index by its age τ . For the purpose of this
quantitative model, there are two key caveats to note however. The first is that the
state space of vintage choice is extended to natural numbers above -1, i.e. τ ≥ −1.
This is due to vintage choice being made one year beforehand, and choosing τ = −1 is
to make firms have the latest vintage when the capital is installed and functional. The
second caveat is that I impose parametric assumption on the function form of F (τ) as
shown below. The parameters ξL,n, n ∈ {0, 1, 2} each governs the relative efficiency
of unskilled labor, the speed of learning, and the asymptotic return to learning.
ζK,t (τ) =ζA,t−τ
ζL,t (τ) =ζA,tF (τ)







Given the assumptions, the profit from the static choice problem is indexed by
three idiosyncratic states, the capital stock k, the vintage of the capital τ and the
demand shifter z.
Π (kt, τ, zt) ≡ Π (kt, ζK,t (τ) , ζL,t (τ) , zt) (1.18)
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Dynamic Capital Investment Problem
After making static profit maximization choices each period, an intermediate firm
needs to decide the capital level and the vintage to use in the next period. Faced with
the firm are three options. The default option is to perform maintenance investment
in which the firm does not alter vintage and only adjust capital stock within an
exogenously defined narrow space. The second option is to incur a nonconvex cost
to gain the freedom to adjust its capital stock using the existing vintage. If the firm
wishes to upgrade its vintage as well, it needs to pay a second nonconvex cost on top
of the first. I refer to the three scenarios as constraint, adjust and update respectively.











The two nonconvex adjustment costs, denoted by ψa and ψu, are in the units of
unskilled labor (Khan & Thomas, 2008; Winberry, 2016), and each follows a uniform
distribution independently over time. Pegging the noncovex cost to other measures
does not alter the main result qualitatively. Each vintage has its endogenous price
linear in its productivity PK,τ = ζK,0ζA,−τ , which is to be rationalized shortly.
The expected value function is given in Equation 1.20, with the expectation taken
over ψa and ψu. The expected value function is equal to the profit from production,
plus the market value of the old capital and the expected value from investment. Λ′
is the stochastic discount factor of the household.
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V̄ (K, z, τ) =Π (K, z, τ) + (1− δ)KPK,−τ+
Eψa,ψu max {V u (K, z, τ) , V a (K, z, τ) V n (K, z, τ)}
V u (K, z, τ) = max
K′∈R,τ ′≥−1
{
−PK,−τ ′K ′ − PK,−τψc (K ′, K)− ψaWL − ψuWL+
E
[
Λ′V̄ (K ′, z′, τ ′ + 1)
]}
V a (K, z, τ) = max
K′∈R
{
−PK,−τ (K ′ + ψc (K ′, K))− ψaWL+
E
[
Λ′V̄ (K ′, z′, τ + 1)
]}
V n (K, z, τ) = max
K′∈(1−δ)K+(−a,a)K
{
−PK,−τ (K ′ + ψc (K ′, K)) +
E
[
Λ′V̄ (K ′, z′, τ + 1)
]}
(1.20)
Assumption 5. When a firm chooses to update, it always choose to update to the
newest vintage.
Assumption 5 is a simplifying assumption. Rigorously it is equivalent to choosing
τ ′ = −1, i.e. choosing the vintage that is to be launched tomorrow. It is trivially true
if all vintages have the same price. Because conditional on incurring the update cost,
the newest vintage is the most productive yet has the same cost. With heterogeneous
vintage prices, the assumption is not necessarily always true. For the calibrated
model, this assumption holds true.
1.5.4 Capital Producing Firm
To endogenize capital prices, I assume a representative and competitive capital pro-
ducing firm that produces all vintages available. The production function is linear in
final good input Y it and the production efficiency ξK,0ζA,t−τ is linear in the produc-
tivity of the vintage. By a simple no arbitrage argument, the market price of vintage
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∀τ ≥ −1 (1.21)
1.5.5 Market Clearing
















In the market for final goods, clearing is given by,
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The equilibrium of this economy is a vector of aggregate allocations {C, I, Y, L, H},
a vector of aggregate prices
{
WH , WL, {PK,−τ}τ≥−1
}
, a distribution of firm poli-
cies
{{












1. household maximize their utility given the prices
2. all types of firms maximize their values given the prices
3. all markets clear
4. the distribution G evolves following the policy function of the intermediate firms;
log (zj) evolves following the AR(1) process
1.5.7 Balanced Growth Path
I assume the world technology frontier grows at a constant rate. All key equations of




1.5.8 Solution of the Steady State
I solve the model in steady state using value function iteration to compute the Bellman
equation (1.20). I approximate the value function using Chebyshev polynomials along
the idiosyncratic capital and demand dimensions but discretize it along the vintage
age dimension. After obtaining the policy function of firms using a coarse grid, I
evaluate the ergodic distribution of firms over a fine grid of idiosyncratic states using
the histogram-based approach (Young, 2010; Terry, 2017). The solution of the steady
state involves repetitively guessing a triplet of both skill-type wages and the aggregate
demand, and I use the market clearing conditions for both labor markets and the final
goods market to evaluate the accuracy of the guesses. The initial guess is derived
from solution to a representative firm model with similar parameterization. New
guesses are updated using a quasi-Newton method. For my benchmark case, I obtain
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the solution to steady state in around 5 minutes. Further details about the solution
algorithm can be found in Appendix A.3.1.
1.5.9 Calibration
I calibrate the steady state of the model to empirical moments calculated using data
from the initial years of the sample. I first divide the structural parameters into three
groups. Parameters in the first group are simply given standard consensus values.
Parameters in the second group are matched to empirical values that are directly
computed from the data. Parameters in the third group are calibrated to empirical
moments internally using Monte-Carlo simulation10. The list of parameters are given
in Table 1.3.
I’d like to elaborate on the parameter choices. Parameters in the first group take
conventional values. In particular, the elasticity of substitution between unskilled la-
bor and capital is close to the 1.67 estimated in Krusell et al. (2000). The second group
of parameters, consisting of supply elasticities for each labor skill type, is estimated
using province by sector level aggregate data obtained from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. The third group, consisting of 13 parameters, are calibrated to
13 empirical moments simultaneously. Nevertheless, some moments are particularly
informative for some parameters. φH is the relative utility cost of supply skilled labor
for the household and it is useful for regulating the gross wage premium.11 α, the
CES weight on machinery, is informed by average labor share. The relative efficiency
10I use a derivative free algorithm (simulated annealing) to find possible candidates for global min-
imum and use an extended Newton method to pin down the local minima around those candidates.
I then pick the global minimum as the one with the smallest Euclidean distance to the empirical
moments.
11One caveat is that I target a gross skill wage premium of 1. This is due to lack of heterogeneous
wage data, and the externally calibrated labor supply elasticities are calculated with respect to the
average wage. Therefore, I deem the gross premium of 1 a reasonable choice. Potentially, I could
have added persistence and correlation of the employment growth rates in the moments to add more
information. But the model is not able to capture the empirical dynamics of employment growth
well. This is due to lack of employment adjustment costs which is an aspect I may improve in future
work.
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of capital κ is particularly informed by the skill composition of the labor force. The
efficiency of capital producing firm ζK,0 regulates the capital price and hence can be
informed by the portion of consumption as of GDP. The perceived speed of technol-
ogy advancement ζK,1 and the parameters regulate the learning-by-doing dynamics
ζL,x x ∈ {0, 1, 2} are jointly determined by the conditional factor adjustment rates,
conditional on capital substitution and expansion respectively. The two upper limits
of noncovex adjustment costs, ψ̄a and ψ̄u, are pinned down by the portion of expan-
sion and capital substitution seen in the data. φK , the penalty on convex investment
adjustment, is informed by the standard deviation of the investment rate. And finally,
the persistence and variance of idiosyncratic demand shocks are affected by the stan-
dard deviation of the sales growth rate and its correlation with the investment rate.
Table 1.3 lists the complete correspondence. The model implies annual technology
growth rate of 9.13%. In comparison, the annual growth rate of average real output
per hour among all G-7 countries from 1972 to2015 is 1.89%. Nonetheless, I deem
the model fitted value reasonable for China, which has been going through massive
policy reforms and opening up ever since 1978.
The calibration results are given in Table 1.4. Overall, the model does a good
job in matching the empirical moments. The model however performs poorly in
matching the dynamics of sales growth rate and investment rate. The empirical
standard deviations for sales growth rates and investment rates are much higher,
indicating that the idiosyncratic demand shock alone is not able to generate enough
volatility. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find that the distribution of firm productivity in
developing economies has higher kurtosis than that in developed economies, indicating
firms in a developing economy like China is subject to a richer set of micro frictions.
To the extent that these frictions are also stochastic, the model’s incompetency to




β household discount factor 0.96
φL household relative disutility for unskilled labor 1
σ elasticity of substitution between M and L 2
ε elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 6
δ capital depreciation rate 0.09




Frisch supply elasticity for skilled labor 1.15
1
ηL
Frisch supply elasticity for unskilled labor 1.40
Calibrated internally
φH household relative disutility for skilled labor 2.75
α relative weight on machinery in CES 0.66
κ relative efficiency of H in producing M 0.77
ζK,0 efficiency of capital producing firm 1.82
ζK,1 growth rate of world technology frontier 0.09
ζL,0 relative efficiency of the unskilled labor 0.25
ζL,1 speed of learning 1.00
ζL,2 asymptotic limit for efficiency gains from learning 0.50
ψ̄a upper limit of nonconvex adjustment cost 0.225
ψ̄u upper limit of nonconvex update cost 0.975
φK size of convex capital adjustment cost 3.38
ρz persistence of idio. demand shock 0.80
σz s.d. of idio. demand shock 0.05
Table 1.3: Calibrated Parameters
Note: Model parameters by group. Those in the first group are assigned conventional values.
Those in the second group are directly estimated using data on employment by skill type obtained
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China; the skilled is defined as those with at least some
college degree, while the unskilled those below college. Those in the third group are calibrated
internally by matching the model generate moments, using Monte-Carlo simulation, to sample
moments calculated in the initial years of the sample.
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Description Data Model Informs
Deceleration rate of employment growth rates after a C.S. 0.04 0.06 ζL,1
Relative average labor layoff rate in a C.S. -0.21 -0.16 ζL,2
Relative average investment rate in a C.S. 0.33 0.08 ζK,1
Relative average investment rate in an expansion event 0.26 0.06 φK
Portion of C.S. event 0.15 0.16 ψ̄u
Portion of expansion 0.18 0.27 ψ̄a
Gross skill wage premium 1.00 0.91 φH
Labor type ratio by skill 3.10 3.02 κ
Overall labor share 0.42 0.38 α
Std. of sales growth rate 0.40 0.15 σz
Std. of investment rate 0.55 0.07 ζL,0
Corr. of sales growth and investment rates 0.17 0.64 ρz
Share of consumption in GDP 0.64 0.66 ζK,0
Table 1.4: Calibrated Moments
Note: C.S. stands for capital substitution episode. Std. stands for standard deviation. The table
lists calibrated moments vs. sample moments and their correspondence to parameters. The
parameters are jointly estimated, but each is particularly informed by some moment as listed.
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1.6 Model Dynamics and Counterfactual
1.6.1 Performance of the Model
After calibrating the model to the data, I evaluate the model’s performance. I recon-
struct the trade liberalization by administering a one-time unexpected demand shock
to the model. In particular, I raise the mean of the innovation term in the idiosyn-
cratic demand shifters, νi in Equation 1.13, permanently in year 1.
12 As a result, the
mean of the demand shifter grows up over time following the AR(1) style dynamics in
the bottom right panel of Figure 1·7. Then I calculate the endogenous transition path,
with details of the calculation in Appendix A.3.2. Figure 1·6 presents the transition
path of key aggregate allocations over the ten years after the shock, where as Figure
1·7 present aggregate price dynamics. As expected, the demand shock expands the
economy, driving up output (top left of Figure 1·6), consumption (top right Figure
1·6), and capital (bottom left Figure 1·6). However the expansion is capital biased,
as the vintage prices are pinned down by their respective productivities and hence
do not go up as the wages do (top row of Figure 1·7). Therefore, firms substitute
towards capital in the long run, reducing their aggregate demand for unskilled labor
(bottom right of Figure 1·6). The demand shock also results in a mild increase in
interest rate as the consumption growth rate picks up (bottom left of Figure 1·7).
Consistent with the empirical evidence, the demand shock generates a temporary
drop in the frequency of capital upgrading as shown in Figure 1·8. The upgrading
frequency is not affected upon impact, as the investment decision is made in year 0
before the shock. The frequency starts to drop in year 2 and recovers approximately
in year 4. Quantitatively, the benchmark IV regression gives a -0.26% reduction in
12I calibrate the size of the shock µε to the change in the skilled to unskilled labor ratio between
2004 (the benchmark value) and 2008 (the new steady state value). The calibrated demand shock
increases the normalized aggregate output by 1.557 times in the new steady state. In comparison, the
gross increase of total real industrial value added between 2001 and 2007 is 1.500 after normalization
(CNBS, n.d.).
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capital upgrading frequency for every 1% increase in exports. To the extent that ex-
ports is a constant portion of output, the model counterpart is -0.30%, an untargeted
result. All in all, the model appears to have a both qualitatively and quantitatively
good fit.
Figure 1·6: Allocations on a Transition Path
Note: Blue line represents the transition path of the variable, while the black dotted line represents
the new steady state. Variables are calculated as log difference from their values in the initial
steady state.
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1.6.2 Reason for the Initial Deceleration of Capital Upgrading
The initial deceleration of capital upgrading is largely driven by strategic waiting in
technology adoption of the firms. Following the assumption on the demand shock,
aggregate demand takes time to fully realize itself, but the future path of demand
is fully anticipated by firms upon impact. Some of the firms that were expecting
to upgrade their capital halt their plans as what they adopt now would have been
technologically less advanced by the time the full potential of the demand shock re-
alizes. Therefore, there is a temporary drop in the capital upgrading rate and hence
a drop in the capital substitution frequency. That a demand shock manifests itself
gradually over time is not a groundless assumption. It takes time to build trade rela-
tionships (Eatona et al., 2014), acquire customer bases (Fitzgerald et al., 2016), and
penetrate markets (Arkolakis, 2010, 2016), so demand may continuously grow after
a trade liberalization. The strategic waiting mechanism is similar to the anticipation
effect studied in Feichtinger et al. (2006). The difference is that firms in Feichtinger
et al. (2006) expect technology to progress faster so that they halt upgrading today
to avoid quick obsolescence, whereas firms in my model expect demand to grow in the
future so they postpone upgrading to be more technologically efficient when catering
to future demand.
I further decompose the initial drop in capital upgrading frequency and plot the
conditional difference in frequency by capital levels (left panel) and vintage age (right
panel) in Figure 1·9. The immediate observation is that the conditional magnitude
of drops in the upgrading frequency exhibits a U-shape with respect to both capital
and vintage age, with firms of medium size and middle-aged vintage that experience
the deepest drop. The intuition is simple. Such firms are the marginal upgraders.
They are not as desperate as firms of small size or old vintage that need to upgrade
immediately regardless of the economic conditions. Yet they are close to the bound-
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aries, so a small increase in the option value of delaying upgrading causes a large drop
in their observed upgrading frequency. In other words, capital upgrading operates in
accordance with an extensive margin logic familiar from the lumpy capital adjustment
literature.
1.6.3 Evaluation of the Drop in Capital Upgrading
To evaluate the economic consequences of the deceleration in capital upgrading due
to strategic waiting, I conduct a counterfactual analysis fixing the capital upgrading
decision policies of firms. In particular, I fix the binary policy function of whether
to upgrade or not as in the initial steady state, as if the firms in the counterfactual
economy didn’t notice the change in aggregate demand along the transition path. The
results are plotted in Figure 1·10 where the blue line represents the benchmark model
and the red line represents the counterfactual. Note that the resulting counterfactual
upgrading decisions are still functions of idiosyncratic states, and therefore, there is
a change in the aggregate capital upgrading rate due to a shift in the distribution
of firms over idiosyncratic states. But the aggregate upgrading frequency shifts less
compared to that in the benchmark model (top left panel). As a result, the average
capital productivity is lower by about 1% in the first four years (top right panel) in
the benchmark model than in the counterfactual. This translates to a 3% reduction
in the aggregate consumption in year 4 (bottom left panel). As capital upgrading re-
accelerates later on, the capital productivity picks up and so does the consumption.
In year 10, the benchmark model has around 3% higher consumption than the coun-
terfactual where the policy function of upgrading does not change. In summary, the
presence of endogenously timed capital upgrading delays the gains in consumption
from demand shocks.
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Figure 1·7: Prices on a Transition Path
Note: Blue line represents the transition path of the variable, while the black dotted line represents
the new steady state. Variables are calculated as log difference from their values in the initial
steady state.
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Figure 1·8: Drop in Capital Upgrading After a Demand Shock
Note: Blue line represents the transition path of the variable, while the black dotted line represents
the new steady state.Variables are calculated as simple difference from their values in the initial
steady state.
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Figure 1·9: Marginal Upgraders Respond Most Negatively
Note: Vertical axes measure the difference between upgrading frequency between that in the first
year of the transition path and that in the initial steady state. The horizontal axis in the left panel
measures log capital, whereas that in the right panel measures the age of the vintage a firm uses.
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Figure 1·10: Strategic Waiting Delays Gains in Consumption
Note: Comparison between the benchmark model (blue) and the counterfactual (gray) in which
the upgrading policy of firms are fixed as that in the initial steady state. The top left panel
measures the aggregate frequency of capital upgrading. The top right measures the average capital
productivity, which is a function of average vintage age. The bottom left panel measures the
aggregate consumption. The bottom right measures the aggregate consumption shock. All series
are calculated as log growth from the initial steady state.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the dynamic response of firms’ capital upgrading decisions to
trade liberalization around China’s accession to WTO. I document the importance
of capital substitution and argue that it closely resembles capital upgrading. Then
by utilizing a trade shock instrument, I document a robust slow down in the capital
substitution frequency in response to a rise in demand brought about by trade liber-
alization. I extend a standard CES production with two special assumptions, vintage
capital and learning-by-doing, to rationalize capital upgrading that appears as capital
substitution. I then extend the simple framework to a general equilibrium model with
firm heterogeneity and show that the model is able to replicate the drop in capital
upgrading frequency in response to a demand shock quantitatively well. The drop
is due to strategic waiting, in which some firms postpone upgrading in order to be
technologically suited to cater to future demand. The strategic waiting delays gains
in consumption from trade liberalization, reducing aggregate consumption by about


























1A previous version of this paper circulated under the title “Location, Location, Location: In-
dustrial Structure and the Distribution of House Price Growth.” We thank numerous seminar par-
ticipants as well as our discussants Evi Pappa and Linda Tesar for helpful comments. All remaining
errors are our own.
Abstract
Manufacturing-heavy US regions recently saw lower employment and income
growth. Exploiting data on over 80 million housing transactions, we show that
house prices grew by less in the same regions, a pattern exaggerated for the
lowest-value homes. Counterfactual accounting exercises reveal that regional
differences in the growth of the lowest-value homes more than fully account for a
recent increase in overall house price inequality. Given the magnitude of housing for
overall wealth, we conclude that differences in regional house price growth,
especially the experience of manufacturing-heavy areas, should receive careful
attention in studies of wealth inequality.
53
2.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades US manufacturing plunged from an aggregate employment
share of over 21% in 1980 to just under 9% in 2010.2 Concurrent with this aggregate
decline, geographic locations where manufacturing used to account for a high share
of employment, such as those in the Upper Midwest or Rust Belt, have seen lower
wage and employment growth than their low-manufacturing peers.
This paper demonstrates that the relatively poor experience of manufacturing
hotspots extends beyond labor market outcomes. We focus on housing, which ac-
counts for around two thirds of assets on the typical US household’s balance sheet.3
We exploit a rich micro dataset of prices and characteristics of around XXX million
recent home transactions with broad geographical coverage. Our analysis proceeds in
three steps.
First, manufacturing-heavy areas saw lower house price growth on average. The
right panel in Figure 2·1 maps the manufacturing employment share in 2000 across
regions, revealing substantial heterogeneity, while the left panel in Figure 2·1 plots
the regional house price growth from 2001-06. The negative spatial correlation with
manufacturing exposure jumps out to the naked eye in the raw data. Our later
more careful analysis suggests that exposure to manufacturing accounts for 44% of
heterogeneity in house price growth across regions.
While these average effects are quantitatively significant, our second finding is
that they mask important heterogeneity in the distributional effects of preexisting
manufacturing exposure. To do so, we leverage the strength of our micro data where
we show that the lowest-value homes in manufacturing-heavy areas experienced sub-
stantially lower price growth than their peers in manufacturing-light locales. This
2These figures are from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Establishment Survey.
3This figure is an author-computed average share of housing in household assets for US home-
owners over the 2001-2016 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finance.
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manufacturing effect on price growth is significantly muted for higher-value homes.
Thus, for manufacturing-heavy regions, house price inequality grew both relative to
other places in the US and within their own region.
Thus, our finding is that exposure to manufacturing quantitatively matters for
the evolution of housing, and hence wealth, inequality: less wealthy residents (in
terms of house valuation) of areas that were more exposed to manufacturing endured
less favorables house price dynamics relative to areas that were less pre-exposed to
manufacturing. As such, in our third contribution, we relate our findings to the overall
evolution in house price inequality. To do so, we exploit our full micro distribution
of US house prices, and demonstrate that inequality in house price growth recently
increased by over 11%, that the increase is mostly regional in nature, and that the
poor house price growth of the lowest-value homes in manufacturing-heavy areas
directly accounts for around a sixth of the change. We view this as an important
quantitative result; solely the exposure to manufacturing of the lowest-value homes
accounts for around a sixth of the increase in total house price inequality over this
period.
Our paper contributes to three strands of work. First, it adds to the literature
studying manufacturing exposure and various labor market and social outcomes (D.
Autor et al., 2018; Alder et al., 2017; Feyrer et al., 2007; Kahn, 1999), expanding
the scope to wealth inequality and house prices. Second, our work contributes to
an understanding of the evolution and consequences of wealth and income inequality
(Kaplan, Moll, et al., 2018; Ahn et al., 2018; Saez & Zucman, 2016; Song et al.,
2018). Third, we add to a broader literature linking house price movements and the
macroeconomy (Piazzesi & Schneider, 2016; Kaplan, Mitman, et al., 2018; Berger
et al., 2018; Guren et al., 2018; Howard & Liebersohn, 2018; Charles et al., 2016).
55
2.2 Data
In this section, we present the data used throughout the analysis.
Housing Data Studying average and distributional shifts in house prices requires
us to follow house price distributions within narrow geographic locations over time.
We rely on a unique micro dataset from Zillow, the ZTRAX dataset, containing more
than XXX million observations from 2001-15 and spanning a wide geography. ZTRAX
combines two sources of information: local municipalities’ transaction records, in-
cluding sales prices, and tax assessment data featuring detailed home characteristics.
Thus, an observation in our dataset combines both the sales price and home char-
acteristics for a single transaction, where within this data, our analysis centers on
single-family homes.
Geography Our measure of local areas is the commuting zone (CZ), an area typ-
ically midsized between a county and state which corresponds to a locally unified
economic agglomeration. This measure ensures comparability with other recent work
on industrial structure and labor market outcomes (D. H. Autor et al., 2013).
Labor Market To measure local manufacturing employment shares, as well as
various other labor market outcomes and controls, we use 1% decennial Census and
annual American Community Survey IPUMS micro data extracts. At the CZ level,
this data provides universal geographic coverage within the US, and sample weights
attached to the micro data allow for the formation of representative measures.
Additional Datasets We also use several other additional sources, including the
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) micro data, aggregated local house prices indexes
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and local housing supply elas-
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ticities from Saiz (2010), to compute various ancillary statistics and provide cross
checks of our main results. See Online Data Appendix A.5 for more details on our
sample construction, exact variable definitions, and summary statistics for each of
the datasets used in this paper.
2.3 House Prices and Manufacturing: Average Effects
Before discussing our results we note that we aim in this paper to sharply document
differences in the price growth of homes in manufacturing-heavy locations versus their
peers in manufacturing-light areas. As we discuss below, we are careful to control for
some traditional high-level confounding factors such as region-specific trends, local
labor market composition, and housing supply elasticities. However, our empirical
strategy of course does not rule out the possibility of remaining omitted factors or
reverse causality potentially at work, since causal identification is not our overall goal.
We begin by quantifying the impact of preexisting manufacturing exposure on the
growth rate of average house prices across locations. Since we are not yet interested
in distributional effects, we use the ZTRAX average CZ-level house price indexes.
Specifically, let pc,t denote the log of the average house prices in CZ c in in year
t ∈ {2001, 2006, 2015}. Then, we consider a regression
∆pc,t = α + βMc,2000 + γXc,2000 + δdiv + εc,t. (2.1)
where Mc,2000 denotes the share of manufacturing in employment in a given CZ in
the year 2000. Since the manufacturing share of a region could be either endogenous to
or a proxy for other regional characteristics, we follow the literature and use standard
additional controls such and use standard additional controls at the CZ level such as
its (i) education composition, (ii) share of female workers, (iii) foreign born workers,
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(a) House Price Change (2001-06) (b) Manufacturing Share (2000)
Figure 2·1: House Price Growth and Manufacturing
Note: Both maps plot the contiguous US in commuting zones. The left map in blues indicates
average percentage house price appreciation from 2001-06, based on local Federal Housing Finance
Agency indexes. The right map in reds indicates the manufacturing share of employment in 2000
based on US Census IPUMS microdata. Darker shades indicate larger values.
and (iv) share of workers in routing cognitive occupations.4 We also augment the
regression with controls for “supply elasticities” (see Saiz (2010) ).5 Since Figure
2·1 suggests that the geographical dispersion of manufacturing is not random but
rather concentrated in specific regions of the United States, we also include Census
division dummies in our regressions. As such, our identification of the impact of pre-
exposure to manufacturing comes from variation in changes within Census division.
Throughout the paper, we cluster standard errors at the state level.6 Finally, because
turbulences in the US housing market formed the epicentre of the financial crisis and
Great Recession, we initially focus on the 2001-2006 period, holding constant the
various shares discussed above at their 2000 values. We later extend our analysis to
the 2001-2015 period and show that our findings are persistent.
4See for example D. H. Autor et al. (2013)
5The ”Saiz elasticities” are available only for 215 commuting zones, while the Wharton index of
land availability covers 712. We regress the Saiz elasticities on the Wharton findex or the overlapping
locations, and then extrapolate for the other ones in order to cover a sider set of CZ.
6We follow the approach in D. H. Autor et al. (2013) who, in a similar econometric framework,
also use (i) Census division dummies, and (ii) cluster standard errors at the state level.
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Table 2.1 provide our first result. In column (1) we see that home prices in
areas with a higher manufacturing share in 2000 grew more slowly over the 2001-
06 period. This result controls for the range of local labor market characteristics
discussed above. In column (2) we verify that the negative association survives in
stable fashion the inclusion of Census division fixed effects. Both columns’ estimates
exhibit high precision. In other words, abstracting from arbitrary trends at work
at the broad region level as well a list of “usual suspects” in labor and housing
markets, manufacturing-heavy areas failed to see house price growth as high as their
low-manufacturing peers.
Percent Change in House Prices (1) (2)
Manufacturing Share -0.488*** -0.467***
(0.142) (0.137)
Controls Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Census Division
Underlying House Transactions 19,670,168 19,670,168
Commuting Zone Observations 179 179
Years 2001-06 2001-06
Adjusted R2 0.227 0.249
Table 2.1: House Prices and Manufacturing
Note: Regressions run at the commuting zone level with the average percentage house price growth
over 2001-06 on the manufacturing employment share in 2000. Controls include the Saiz (2010)
housing supply elasticity, the percent of routine cognitive jobs, the college educated working share,
the female working share, and the foreign working share. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the state level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
The magnitudes at work here prove large. Consider a CZ at the 75th percentile
of manufacturing exposure, which has a 2000 manufacturing employment share 6.7%
higher than its peer at the 25th percentile. Our estimates in column (2) predict that
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house price growth from 2001-06 in that same CZ will be 0.467 × 6.7 ≈ 3.1% lower per
year than in the manufacturing-light region. The drop of 3.1% in house price growth
each year represents variation of 3.1 / 7.0 ≈ 44% relative to the interquartile range
(IQR) of house price growth in the full sample, the figure we cite in our introduction.
Since we are not yet interested in distributional effects, we can verify these average
effects with publicly available data from the FHFA, which has a wider geographical
coverage. We thus onstruct the average CZ-level house price indexes with the FHFA
data and, as reported in Table A3, we demonstrate very similar results using this
alternative to the ZTRAX database.7
2.4 House Prices and Manufacturing Across the Distribution
2.4.1 Location in the House Distribution
We now turn our attention to our main question of interest: are the negative effects of
manufacturing exposure on house price growth distributionally neutral? Or did the
manufacturing exposure at the CZ level impact some parts of the housing distribution
more than others?
In order to study these distributional local price dynamics, we need to first form
a distribution of house prices within each CZ and allocate each transaction to its
relevant point at this distribution. There are two options we pursue in achieving this
goal.
The first solution follows the methodology of the Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller
Home Price indexes and relies only on repeated sales of individual properties. In this
approach, we know to which part in the distribution of house prices within a CZ a
given house belongs to in a base year (in our case 2001). We then observe the change
7To further validate the ZTRAX data, we note that when we use the FHFA data only for the
CZ for which we have coverage, we estimate a manufacturing coefficient of -0.444, which is almost
identical to the -0.467 coefficient reported in the fourth column of Table 1. We are therefore confident
that the transactions contained in the ZTRAX dataset are representative.
60
in house prices for these repeated sales. This results then in only within-property
variation in prices controlling for fixed unobservable characteristics. Under the as-
sumption that that no major changes occurred with these houses we can characterize
the dynamics of house prices at different parts of the distribution.
The second solution uses an hedonic approach based on projecting house prices on
a list of observable house characteristics. In a nutshell, the approach consists first of
estimating with 2001 transactions the loading of house prices on various amenities.8
Next, using these loading and the amenities of houses sold in 2006 we can ”rank” each
house within the distribution of 2001 home prices. We therefore ensure that state-
ments made about ”high value” or ”low value” homes reflect consistent comparisons
and valuations of home characteristics across time. We can then construct for each
CZ and segment at the 2001 housing distribution the mean house price growth rate
during our time period (2001-2006), which becomes our dependent variable.
The tradeoffs between the two approaches are clear. The repeat sales approach
does not require assumptions about the list of relevant housing characteristics. But
the hedonic approach of course allows for wider data coverage across time, space, and
properties. Despite the large size of our dataset, the repeated sales approach results
in a significantly smaller sample size. As such to present a baseline relying on as broad
an underlying sample as possible, we first compute local house price changes using
the hedonic method. However, in Appendix XXXX we verify that for our purposes,
the hedonic versus repeat sales distinction turns out to matter little for our main
results.
8The amenities we include are square footage, year of construction, number of rooms, number of




We divide all transaction in our benchmark year (2001), into three equally sized
price terciles or segments: low-value, mid-value, and high-value. Using the hedonic
pricing approach discussed above, we then map homes in later years into the same
three segments based on a consistent valuation of their characteristics. The growth
of average prices from 2001-06 within each CZ × segment cell provides our main
outcome measure. Table 2.2 presents estimates at the CZ × segment level. Our first
specification is given by
∆pc,s,t = α + ks + βMc,2000 + ρ (S ×Mc,2000) + γXc,2000 + δdiv + εc,t. (2.2)
where s ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes the segment (tercile) of the housing distribution and
ks denotes the segment fixed effect. We continue to control for all the variables
discussed in Equation (2.1). Hence, in this specification we interact the manufacturing
employment share with the house price tercile. This tightly parametric specification
investigates whether the association between manufacturing shares and subsequent
house price growth differs when moving from low-value homes (with House Price
Tercile = 1) to mid-value homes (House Price Tercile = 2) to high-value homes (House
Price Tercile = 3). Column (1) reports the results. The price of homes of all values
grew more slowly on average in high-manufacturing areas. But the positive and
precisely estimated interaction reveals that exposure to manufacturing predicts even
lower price growth for the lowest-value segments.
Column (2) provides a more flexible nonparametric specification, interacting man-
ufacturing shares at the CZ-level with dummy variables for each house-price segment
or tercile. Our second regression is then
∆pc,s,t = α + ks + β1s ×Mc,2000 + γXc,2000 + δdiv + εc,t. (2.3)
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where 1s is an indicator function which equals one when an observation belongs to
the relevant housing segment which is interacted with the manufacturing employment
share. This nonparametric approach to measuring heterogeneous house price dynam-
ics leads to the same qualitative conclusion as Column (1). While low-value homes
display sharply lower growth in the face of manufacturing exposure, their high-value
neighbors experienced more muted drops. To summarize, manufacturing exposure
predicts relatively more within-region house price inequality, not less.
The magnitudes at work here prove large once again. For a high-manufacturing
CZ at the 75th percentile of manufacturing shares in 2000, column (2) reveals that
low-value homes experienced 0.690 × 6.7 ≈ 4.6% lower yearly subsequent house price
growth than the same segment in a light-manufacturing CZ at the 25th percentile of
exposure. By contrast, their high-value neighbors saw a drop in relative price growth
of around 0.448 × 6.7 ≈ 3.0% per year, i.e., shifts over a third smaller in magnitude.
Our analysis to this point focuses on the pre-Great Recession period from 2001-
06 in order to avoid picking up financial crisis-specific factors associated with the
large disruption in housing markets from 2007 onwards. However, with that caveat
in mind, column (3) bridges the Great Recession and expands the horizon of our
analysis by nine years to the 2001-15 period. The results, based on a nonparametric
specification comparable to column (2), indicate persistent and long-lasting differences
in the price growth of the lowest-value homes in manufacturing-heavy areas. In
particular, low-value homes at the 75th percentile of manufacturing exposure grew
by 0.088 × 6.7 ≈ 0.6% less on a yearly basis over the 2001-15 period relative to
their peers at the 25th percentile of manufacturing exposure, a precisely estimated
cumulative decline of around 8% in relative terms. By contrast, at the end of the
period in 2015 their high-value neighbors in manufacturing-exposed areas had not
experienced any precise differences in growth relative to their manufacturing-light
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peers. Our prediction of increased inequality within heavy manufacturing regions
therefore proves quite persistent.
In Appendix A.4 we present a simple model where these finding rise naturally if (i)
regions are heterogenous in their exposure to the manufacturing sector (as depicted
in Figure 2·1), (ii) and manufacturing workers, who have experienced worse labor
market outcomes than non-manufacturing workers, live disproportionately in lower-
priced houses.We present empirical evidence consistent with these assumptions in
Appendix A.4, providing thus a framework that rationalizes our results.
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Ptg. Change in House Prices (1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction Parametric Non-Parametric Parametric Non-Parametric
Years 2001-06 2001-06 2001-15 2001-15
Manufacturing Share -0.816*** -0.174***
(0.179) (0.051)
Manufacturing Share 0.121*** 0.079***
* Housing Tercile (0.037) (0.013)
Manufacturing Share -0.690*** -0.088*
* Low-Value Houses (0.151) (0.047)
Manufacturing Share -0.583*** -0.029
* Mid-Value Houses (0.142) (0.041)
Manufacturing Share -0.448*** 0.071
* High-Value Houses (0.123) (0.045)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Census Div. Census Div. Census Div. Census Div.
Underlying Transactions 19,670,169 19,670,169 43,686,431 43,686,431
CZ-by-Tercile Obs. 535 535 535 535
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.286 0.387 0.388
Table 2.2: House Prices and Manufacturing Across the Distribution
Note: Regressions run at the commuting zone x house price tercile level with the percent change in
average house prices for the relevant cell on the manufacturing employment share in 2000. The
terciles reflect 2001 home values. Controls include the Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity, the
percent of routine cognitive jobs, the college educated working share, the female working share,
and the foreign working share. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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2.5 Shifts in House Price Inequality
The value of housing represents an average of 60% of total assets for an average
homeowner in the US, a fraction which is stable in SCF micro data over the 2001-16
period. Remarkably, the figure comprises a still dominant share of 40% of total assets
on average across the full sample of homeowner and non-homeowner US households
combined.9 Given these magnitudes, house price inequality therefore maps mechan-
ically and critically to wealth inequality. In light of the importance of housing for
wealth, we exploit the full distribution of home prices in our ZTRAX micro data to
document some recent overall shifts in house price inequality. We then engage in a
series of simple counterfactual accounting exercises, zeroing in on factors such as re-
gional inequality, manufacturing exposure, and the price dynamics of the lowest-value
homes.
The top panel of Table 2.3 reports that inequality in log house prices rose from a
standard deviation of 87.9% in 2001 to 92.8% in 2015, an increase in cross-sectional
variance of (0.928/0.879)2-1 ≈ 11.5%. Increased inequality manifested itself mostly
for low-value homes, while dispersion in mid-value and high-value homes remained
fairly flat or declined over the same period. To account in more detail for these shifts
in inequality, we introduce some additional notation and an accounting framework
which can be mapped directly to our data. In particular, write the log price ph,c,s,t of
house h in CZ c in home value segment s in year t as
ph,c,s,t = µc,s,t + σc,s,tεh,c,s,t.
Above, µc,s,t is the average price in the CZ × segment × year cell, and σc,s,t is
the standard deviation of the same cell. The values εh,c,s,t represent the normalized
9These figures are based on the SCF micro data and our own tabulations, detailed in Online
Data Appendix A.5.
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Panel A: Observed Data
Log Standard Deviation in Year: 2001 2015
All Houses 0.879 0.928
Low-Value Houses 0.920 1.132
Mid-Value Houses 0.853 0.876
High-Value Houses 0.862 0.726
Panel B: Counterfactuals
Log Standard Deviation for
All Houses in Year: 2001 2015
Observed 0.879 0.928
Removing All Regional and Segment
House Price Growth Differences 0.879 0.854
Removing Low-Value
House Price Growth Differences 0.879 0.873
Removing Mfg.-Predicted Low-Value
House Price Growth Differences 0.879 0.921
Underlying House Transactions 2,664,242 2,255,561
Table 2.3: House Price Inequality
Note: The top panel reports observed inequality in house prices in various categories in the
indicated year. The bottom panel reports the inequality for all homes in each year under various
counterfactuals described in the text.
prices of homes, featuring zero mean and unit standard deviation within a cell. We
can directly and easily compute estimates of each of the values in the decomposition
above directly from our micro data. This simple accounting framework reveals that
an increase in the variance or inequality of overall house prices can in principle stem
from any of three shifts: (i) an increase over time in within-cell dispersion σc,s,t which
is common across all c × s cells, (ii) heterogeneous shifts over time in the within-cell
dispersions σc,s,t, or (iii) heterogeneity in the growth over time of average prices µc,s,t
across cells.
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Our empirical results so far, documenting distinct growth rates for average prices
µc,s,t in CZ × segment cells, map directly to the final channel (3). As such, we seek to
quantify the importance of this growth rate heterogeneity through a series of simple
counterfactuals or accounting exercises.
In our first counterfactual, we shut down all heterogeneity in the growth of mean
house prices µc,s,t across c or s over the 2001-15 period. The first counterfactual listing
in the bottom panel of Table 2.3 reveals that the 2015 standard deviation of log prices
under this scenario is 85.4%, implying an overall decline in house price inequality in
this period absent heterogeneous growth rates across cells. In other words, differences
in the average growth of home prices across regions and home-value segments more
than fully accounts for increased overall house price inequality.
In our second counterfactual, we narrow in on the role of low-value homes. We shut
down heterogeneity across regions in the growth rate of only the low-value housing
segments. The second counterfactual reported in the bottom panel of Table 2.3
reveals that the 2015 standard deviation of log prices under this scenario is 87.3%,
again implying an overall decline in house price inequality absent heterogeneity in the
average growth of the lowest-value homes across regions. In other words, differences
in the average growth of only the lowest-value home prices across regions more than
fully account – on their own – for increased overall house price inequality.
Our two initial decompositions lead to the striking conclusion that regional dif-
ferences, and in particular those for the very lowest-value homes, prove critical for
understanding increased house price inequality. In our third counterfactual, motivated
by our manufacturing regressions, we narrow even further. We ask what portion of the
change in the overall inequality is house prices is predicted solely by the manufacturing
exposure of only the lowest-value homes? We therefore shut down all heterogeneity in
the growth rate of mean prices for the lowest-value segment of homes predicted by our
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regressions in column (3) of Table 2.2. The third counterfactual listing in the bottom
panel of Table 2.3 reveals that the 2015 standard deviation of log prices under this
scenario is 92.1%. In other words, house price inequality would still have increased
absent predicted variation from manufacturing exposure at the bottom of the housing
distribution. But the resulting distribution would exhibit an increase in variance of
only (0.921/0.879)2-1 ≈ 9.7%. This increase in inequality by 9.7 percentage points
is 15 percent smaller than the observed increase. In other words, heterogeneity in
average growth rates for only the lowest-value homes predicted only by their expo-
sure to manufacturing accounts for around a sixth of the increase in total house price
inequality over this period.
There are three main takeaways from this distributional analysis. First, given the
importance of housing in wealth, any analysis of wealth inequality must confront the
dynamics of house price inequality. Second, any analysis of house price inequality
must grapple with important heterogeneity in the growth of home prices across re-
gions, especially for the very lowest-value homes. And third, manufacturing-heavy
regions account for a meaningful fraction of the increase in overall inequality solely
through the lower price growth experienced by their lowest-value homes.
2.6 Conclusions
Our analysis leverages a rich dataset of tens of millions of house price transactions
tracked by Zillow. We show that areas with higher exposure to the US manufacturing
sector experienced lower growth in home prices on average in recent years. Further,
the lowest-value homes in these regions experienced an even heavier decline in price
growth relative to their higher-value neighbors. In other words, manufacturing expo-
sure predicts shifts in both cross-region and within-region inequality in house prices.
We document that manufacturing-heavy regions also experienced lower average
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employment and wage growth over the same period. If manufacturing workers dis-
proportionately cluster towards the lower end of the home value distribution, a fact we
verify empirically, a simple theoretical model which we develop rationalizes our house
price findings as driven by local income declines in manufacturing and segmented
housing markets.
In a final exercise leveraging our full distribution of house prices at the micro
level, we show that a recent increase in house price inequality is fully accounted
for by heterogeneity across regions in the growth of prices of the lowest-value homes,
exactly those dwellings disproportionately predicted to grow more slowly in the face of
manufacturing exposure. The value of housing is an asset accounting for a dominant
share of US households’ wealth on average. So our results dictate that any analysis
of wealth inequality pay careful attention to regional heterogeneity in house price
growth, as well differences industrial structure across areas.
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Chapter 3
Transmission of Monetary Policy Through
Housing
Abstract
I combine standard econometric tools and a structural model to study the effect of
monetary policy on consumption through housing. Exploiting quarterly US data
dating back to 1975 and employing a canonical SVAR model, I estimate that a 1%
unexpected contractionary monetary policy shock causes average house price to
drop by about 1.4% in two years before eventually stabilizing at a permanent 1.8%
loss. Feeding this empirical response to an incomplete market model with housing
as an unexpected shock, the aggregate consumption is shifted off the steady state by
about 0.3%. I then decompose the aggregate dynamics into three channels: the
wealth channel, the collateral channel, and the substitution channel. Quantitatively,
the wealth channel is the most important in shaping the aggregate dynamics,
accounting for around 2/3 of the drop in aggregate consumption at the trough. The
collateral channel in net is quantitatively less important. Yet the net number masks
important heterogeneity and churning in how the collateral channel manifests itself
conditional on the willing of the household to adjust their housing position. It
increases the average consumption of the adjustors by about 0.3% while reducing
that of the non-adjustors by about 0.2%. Finally, I show that a
“lean-against-the-wind” policy that relieves the credit constraint of the households
can greatly stabilize the transition dynamics.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter adds to a large body of work that studies the transmission of monetary
policy (Doepke & Schneider, 2006; Auclert, 2019; Kaplan, Moll, et al., 2018) by
zeroing in on one particular aspect: the dissipation of monetary policy shocks through
housing. A house, or any other form of residential estate, is a special good. Not only
it is one of the largest assets in a household’s balance sheet, representing around 60%
of the total assets held by a typical US household, a house is also a major utility-
generating durable good as well as an important collateral in household financing.
Because of these multi-dimension roles, there has been a series of work showing high
sensitivity of household spending to house price movements (Berger et al., 2018, and
empirical work cited therein).
However, exactly because of these multi-dimension roles, it is very difficult to
correctly model the effect of monetary policy on house price dynamics, making a
pure structural approach to charting the transmission of monetary policy through
housing highly challenging. On the other hand, prominent econometric tools that
estimate the dynamic impacts of monetary policy, such as the structural vector auto-
regression (SVAR), are readily available. Therefore, I choose to combine the strengths
of both approaches to tackle the problem. Specifically, I first empirically estimate the
response of the average house price to a monetary policy shock, and then I feed the
impulse response of the house price to a calibrated structural model with housing to
study the consumption response.
Exploiting quarterly US data dating back to 1975 and employing a canonical
SVAR model, I estimate that a 1% unexpected surge in the Federal Fund Rate would
lead to a 1.4% drop in the average house price in 2 years. And the response is
persistent. The house price would continue to drop until it stabilizes at a 1.8%
permanent loss in a decade. In the baseline SVAR specification, I use the Cholesky
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decomposition and CEE-like (Christiano et al., 2005) ordering of the data series,
but the quantitative result is robust under alternative specifications of the structural
matrices.
I then feed the impulse response of the house price as unexpected shock to an
incomplete market model with housing that is calibrated to the US data. The house
price shock shifts the aggregate consumption by about 0.3% off the steady state,
representing a semi-elasticity of consumption to monetary policy shock of 0.3. The
magnitude of this effect on consumption is large. As a comparison, Wong (2019)
reports an average total semi-elasticity of 0.92. Albeit estimated using different data
and methodology, my result shows that the impact of monetary policy on consumption
through housing represents about 1/3 of the total impact reported in Wong (2019),
suggesting the importance of housing in the transmission of monetary policy.
I then decompose the aggregate dynamics into three major channels: the wealth
channel, the collateral channel, and the substitution channel. Quantitatively, the
wealth channel is the most important in shaping the aggregate dynamics, contribut-
ing to about 0.23% loss in aggregate consumption in the trough and hence accounting
for around 2/3 of the total drop. Yet the aggregate dynamics masks important het-
erogeneity in the how these channels manifest themselves. Specifically, I show that
the collateral channel works almost exactly the opposite on households that are rel-
atively willing to adjust their housing positions (adjustors) from on those that are
not (non-adjustors). Intuitively, the drop in house price tightens the borrowing con-
straint of the households, forcing adjustors to purchase a smaller house. As a result,
adjustors compensate their utility loss by increasing their non-housing consumption.
On the other hand, the non-adjustors, unwilling to adjust their housing positions,
have to bear the loss of credit capacity by cutting off their non-housing consumption.
The collateral channel increases the adjustors’ average consumption by about 0.3%
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while reducing the non-adjustors’ average consumption by about 0.2%. In aggregate,
the increase in the adjustors’ consumption dominates. Finally, I show that a “lean-
against-the-wind” policy that matches the interest to the house price growth can
stabilize the consumption dynamics by relieving the credit constraint of the house-
holds.
The paper is closely related to three pieces of work in the literature. Berger et
al. (2018) provide a seminar framework to study the consumption response to house
price movements, with emphasis on cross-sectional comparison in the steady state.
I incorporate most of their setup in a dynamic setting to study the consumption
response to the house price changes that are the result of an unexpected monetary
policy shock. Wong (2019) also studies how monetary policy shocks affect consump-
tion through housing, but her emphasis is on the heterogeneous exposure to interest
shocks through mortgages, while mine is on the responses through pure house price
movements. I see my work as a complement to hers. Elbourne (2008) estimates
the effect of monetary policy on consumption through housing in the UK. Instead
of a pure empirical approach, I use a structural model to estimate the consumption
response to house price changes brought about by a monetary policy shock, which
allows me to carefully dissect the aggregate dynamics to analyze the channels through
which the shocks manifest and the groups of households they impact upon.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 empirically estimates
the impulse response of the average house price to a monetary policy shock. Section
3.3 introduces the structural model with housing, and calibrate it to the US data.
Section 3.4 feeds the empirical impulse response of the house price to the model,
computes the transition path of key aggregates, decomposes the aggregates into three
channels, reveals heterogeneity in how the channels work, and discusses a possible
policy intervention. The final section concludes.
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3.2 Empirical Estimation of House Price Response to Mon-
etary Policy Shocks
As a first step, I aim to obtain an empirical estimation of the response of the aggregate
house price to a monetary policy shock. I will start with introducing the data that I
use, then move on to describe the SVAR model, and finally conclude with presenting
the empirical impulse response functions (IRFs).
3.2.1 Data
In the baseline case, I exploit six data series,
1. RPCE: a real measure of total private consumption expenditure, including both
spending on housing and related services as well as that on non-housing goods
and services;
2. RGDP: a real measure of gross domestic product;
3. HPI: a real measure of all-transaction house price index that is based on data
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and that is deflated by the consumer
price index described below;
4. CPI: a measure of consumer price index for all urban consumers;
5. FFR: a measure of the effective Federal Fund Rate;
6. M2: a measure of M2.
All data series are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data service, are
in quarterly frequency, and are dated back to the first quarter of 1975, the earliest
date for which the HPI is available. Figure 3·1 presents the raw data series in use. Not
surprisingly, all series have some form of trends. I therefore conduct augmented Dicky-
Fuller tests on each of the series to determine the appropriate de-trending method.
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The results are summarized in Table 3.1. According to the table, all data series in
their (log) levels fail to reject the null that a unit root is present. Therefore, all series
are first log differenced to remove the unit root1, except for the FFR. Although the
FFR in its level only passes the ADF test at 10% confidence level, I choose to use its
level rather than its first difference to keep consistency with the existing literature.
Treating the FFR as a stationary variable in its own right is also consistent with most
macroeconomic theories. The processed data are plotted in Figure 3·2. All series are
now visually stationary and are able to pass the ADF tests at 1% confidence level.
3.2.2 Empirical Model
Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) is a prominent econometric tool in esti-
mating the empirical impacts of a monetary policy shock. See Ramey (2016) for a
comprehensive survey. The baseline SVAR specification that I implement is simple
and canonical. Let y be the vector of the six data series,
y = [RPCE, RGDP, HPI, CPI, FFR, M2]T (3.1)
As aforementioned, each series is first log differenced except for FFR which is in
level. The reduced form regression I estimate is given in Equation 3.2. I control for
lags of the dependent variables for up to the n-th order, whereas Ci, i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}
are the respective reduced form coefficient matrices. I also control for a vector of
constants β0, linear trends β1, and seasonal dummies sj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. AIC suggests




Ciyt−i + β0 + β1t+
3∑
j=1
sj + µt (3.2)
Based on the results of the VAR estimation, I estimate a structural VAR model
1To be precise, all data series except for FFR are first log differenced and then times 100
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as in Equation 3.3. The structural residuals εt is assumed to be a vector of i.i.d.
multivariate normal random variables with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix
(VCV) equal to the identity matrix. These structural residuals are interpreted as
structural shocks, whereas the µt in the VAR model are the reduced form residuals
satisfying the relation µt = A
−1
0 Bεt. The structural coefficient matrices satisfy the
















In the baseline case, the identification strategy is simply the Sims (1980) approach.
I assume that B is a diagonal matrix and A0 is a lower unitriangular matrix (lower
triangular matrix with all the diagonal elements equal to 1). Note A−10 B forms a
Cholesky Decomposition of the variance covariance matrix of the reduced form resid-
uals Σµ. The Sims Approach relies on a set of progressive timing restrictions, and
therefore the order of the data series is important. The order that I use, which is
given in Equation 3.1, follows the logic in another seminar work Christiano et al.
(2005). The essential idea is that innovations to the Federal Reserve’s policy do not
immediately manifest in other aspects of the economy, nominal or real, except for
the money in circulation. Yet innovations to key macroeconomic measures will en-
ter the contemporaneous policy consideration. Hence the FFR is listed the second
last in the data vector y. In addition, contemporaneous innovations in real variables
such as consumption and investment (captured in RGDP) can affect prices contem-
poraneously but not vice versa. This logic is consistent with predictions of standard
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macroeconomic models with frictions in investment and consumption adjustments,
such as the presence of investment adjustment costs and consumption habits. All the
results presented below are robust to alternative orderings of the data series, more
complex assumptions on A0, exclusion of the controls for trend and seasonality, and
even inclusion of additional data series. See Appendix for details.
3.2.3 Impulse Response Function
With structural matrices identified, I then shock the system of equations with an
increase of 100 basis points in the structural monetary policy shock, and plot the
impulse response functions (IRFs) in Figure 3·3. All data series are simulated forward
for 40 quarters. Except for the Federal Fund Rate, all data series are presented in
cumulative changes, i.e. they are in their respective log levels. The shaded area
represents the 95% confidence interval and is obtained by bootstrapping 100 times.
As expected, the contractionary shock leads to a mild recession of about 62 bp
in output and of 48 bp in total consumption two years after the shock. Importantly,
the shock also puts downward pressure on the average house price, pushing down the
HPI by about 137 bp in two years. In addition, the pattern is persistent, with the
HPI continuing to drop and only slightly recovering after about six years. Ten years
after the shock, the house price index stabilizes at about 183 bp below its initial level.
The result implies that a two year house price elasticity to monetary policy shock of
−137/100 = −1.37. In comparison, the counterpart is about -0.5 for UK (Elbourne,
2008), -2 for Norway (Robstad, 2018), and -0.4 for the US (Paul, 2019). Therefore,
my finding is large but is within the reported range in the literature.
This result is also large in economic sense. Let’s make a back-of-the-envelop
calculation. Under the assumptions that the average wealth to consumption ratio is
7.22 and that households do not adjust their housing positions after the shock and
2Calculated by assuming that the US households net worth to GDP ratio equals 5 and that the
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that housing accounts for half of the US households’ assets, the 137 bp drop in two
years translates into a reduction in wealth that is equal to 1.37 × 0.5 × 7.2 ≈ 4.9%
of consumption for a household with zero debt, and 14.7% of consumption for a
household with debt to equity ratio of 2. Nonetheless, the estimation is rough, and
readers should keep in mind that the astounding number relies on a set of restrictive
assumptions. Therefore, a careful and rigorous structural analysis is in much demand.
consumption to GDP ratio equals 0.7.
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Figure 3·1: Raw Data Series
Note: All data series are in quarterly frequency between 1975Q1 and 2019Q4. The real PCE is a
real measure of total private consumption expenditure; the real GDP is a real measure of gross
domestic product; the HPI is a real measure of all-transaction house price index; the CPI is a
measure of consumer price index for all urban consumers; the FFR is a measure of the effective
Federal Fund Rate; and the M2 is simply a measure of M2.
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Variable Test Stat Lags Crit. 1pct Crti. 5pct Crit. 10pct
log(RPCE) -0.91 1 -3.99 -3.43 -3.13
∆ log(RPCE) -9.63 0 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57
log(RGDP) -1.56 2 -3.99 -3.43 -3.13
∆ log(RGDP) -6.76 1 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57
log(HPI) -1.59 2 -3.99 -3.43 -3.13
∆ log(HPI) -7.09 1 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57
log(CPI) -3.48 2 -3.99 -3.43 -3.13
∆ log(CPI) -6.17 1 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57
FFR -3.25 1 -3.99 -3.43 -3.13
∆ FFR -11.24 0 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57
log(M2) -2.90 1 -3.99 -3.43 -3.13
∆ log(M2) -7.73 0 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57
Table 3.1: Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests
Note: “Test Stat” shows the test statistics of the ADF tests, “Lags” shows the number of lags
controlled, and the rest are critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All tests control for a
linear trend and a constant whenever the series are in (log) levels, and control for a constant
whenever the series are in first difference. The RPCE is a real measure of total private
consumption expenditure; the RGDP is a real measure of gross domestic product; the HPI is a real
measure of all-transaction house price index; the CPI is a measure of consumer price index for all
urban consumers; the FFR is a measure of the effective Federal Fund Rate; and the M2 is simply a
measure of M2.
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Figure 3·2: Processed Data Series
Note: All data series are in quarterly frequency between 1975Q1 and 2019Q4. The real PCE is a
real measure of total private consumption expenditure; the real GDP is a real measure of gross
domestic product; the HPI is a real measure of all-transaction house price index; the CPI is a
measure of consumer price index for all urban consumers; the FFR is a measure of the effective
Federal Fund Rate; and the M2 is simply a measure of M2.
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Figure 3·3: Impulse Response Functions to a 100 bp Monetary Policy
Shock
Note: CEE setup. All series are cumulative changes of their log differences except for the FFR.
The 95% confidence intervals are estimated via bootstrapping. The RPCE is a real private
consumption expenditure series that cover everything; the RGDP is a real GDP index; the HPI is
a nominal housing price index; the CPI is a inflation measure on all consumptions by US urban
residents; the FFR is the effective Federal Fund Rate; and the M2 is a simply a measure of M2.
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3.3 Structural Model with Housing
In this section, I describe a structural housing model that carefully captures the
multiple roles housing plays to a household, namely an asset, a durable good and
a collateral. This model features an incomplete market, uninsurable idiosyncratic
income risks, and a housing sector. Its basic structure follows closely the setup in
Berger et al. (2018), yet with two important differences. The first is a simplification
on the age dimension. Instead of a full age spectrum spanning the whole lifetime,
I categorize the households into two main age groups, the young and the old. The
second is an alternative specification of the non-convex housing adjustment cost to
accommodate a continuous approximation of the household value function. Both
changes retain the essential features and mechanisms in the model while greatly re-
lieving the computational burden, allowing me to focus on the dynamic aggregate
responses of the economy. More details follow below.
3.3.1 Model
Time is discrete. There is an unit continuum of households with two age types, the
young and the old. A household is born young but without any asset. Each period,
a young household faces an exogenous probability θo to become an old household.
An old household differs from the young in its wage profile which will be specified
later. In addition, an old household may die with an exogenous probability of θd
each period and be replaced with a successive young. Once dead, the old household’s
remaining wealth is fully taxed and wasted. The old households therefore do not take
into consideration the utilities of the successive young.
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Income Process
A young household faces idiosyncratic income risks. The income process is a Markov
chain with three states, high, middle and low. Denote a household’s income e ∈
{Wl,Wm,Wh}, and the transition probability π(y|x) = P (e′ = y|e = x). An old
household retires when she becomes old and receives a pension stream that is a portion
b of her latest income before retirement. A newly born young draws an income level
from the ergodic distribution of the Markov chain.
Investment
A household can invest in two assets, a risk free bond and a house. Each household
has one and only one residential house, but the house may differ in its size. Both the
return on the risk free bond Rf and the house price Ph are exogenous. Households
can borrow the risk free bond by collateralizing their houses. As Equation 3.5 puts it,
only a portion (1− ζ) of the value of the new house discounted by the prevailing real
return can be collateralized. Negative positions in the risk free bond can be thought
of as mortgages or households extracting equity using credit vehicles such as the
home equity line of credit (HELOC). ζ therefore corresponds to the mortgage down
payment ratio, or more generally can be thought of as a measure of financial frictions.
Houses do not generate any financial yields but rather depreciate at a constant rate






Serving as a collateral and investment instrument so far, a house is also a durable
good. Households gain utilities from a numeraire consumption good and housing. Let
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the household’s flow utility be u(c, h). I assume that u(c, h) is CRRA in a generalized








Put together, the household’s problem can be summarized by the following Bell-
man equations. Let V y(a, h) (V o(a, h)) be the value function of the young (old).
Formally,
V y(e, a, h) = max
c,h+,a+
{














V o(e, a, h) = max
c,h+,a+
{u(c, h+) + β(1− θd)V o(e, a+, h+)}





Note that by assumption, a newly born young has value function V y(e, 0, 0).
Introducing Non-convex Housing Adjustment Cost
Data suggests that households adjust their housing positions infrequently, which is
consistent with the presence of some form of non-convex adjustment cost. The non-
convex adjustment cost can be pecuniary, such as commission fees for the realtors,
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taxes on the transaction, and discounts due to illiquidity of the housing market. Or
it can be non-pecuniary, such as time and efforts one has to dedicate while finding,
purchasing and moving to a new house. From the model’s perspective, the two forms
of costs do not differ as much as they do in reality. For computational convenience,
instead of the pecuniary cost Berger et al. (2018) model it, I choose to introduce
the non-convex adjustment cost as a linear utility cost proportional to the value of
the old house in a similar fashion as Khan and Thomas (2008) treat the non-convex
investment adjustment cost.
Specifically, a household receives a negative stochastic utility shock τ whenever
they decide to adjust their housing stock. The magnitude of this shock independently
and identically follows a uniform distribution between 0 and an upper bound that is
proportional to the value of their existing housing stock in the last period. Formally,
τ(e, a, h) ∼ U [0, τ̄hPh−] (3.9)
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Then the young household’s problem becomes,
V ya(e, a, h) = max
c,h+,a+
{













V yn(e, a, h) = max
c,a+
{













h+ = (1− δ)h
V̄ y(e, a, h) =
τ̃ y(e, a, h)
τ̄




τ̃ y(e, a, h)
τ̄
)V yn(e, a, h)












Similarly, the old household’s problem is,
V oa(e, a, h) = max
c,h+,a+
{
u(c, h+) + β(1− θd)V̄ o(e, a+, h+)
}




V on(e, a, h) = max
c,h+,a+
{
u(c, h+) + β(1− θd)V̄ o(e, a+, h+)
}




h+ = (1− δ)h
V̄ o(e, a, h) =
τ̃ y(e, a, h)
τ̄




τ̃ y(e, a, h)
τ̄
)V on(e, a, h)











The main advantage of this strategy is that the random utility shock smooths the
expected value function V̄ x, and therefore opens up a plethora of techniques that can
speed up the approximation and optimization of the value functions.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
This is a partial equilibrium model with endowment. A formal definition of an equi-
librium is given as follows,
Definition 6. An Equilibrium of this economy is a set of policy rules {cx,hx,ax, τ̃ x}x∈{y,o}
that are functions of the idiosyncratic states {e, a, h}, a pair of expected value func-
tions
{
V̄ y(e, a, h), V̄ o(e, a, h)
}
and a distribution of households along the idiosyncratic
states Γ, such that given the path of aggregate states {st}t , st = {Rf,t, Ph,t},
• The policy rules {cx,hx,ax}x∈{y,o} maximizes the conditional value functions
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{V xa, V xn}x∈{y,o} as specified in Equation 3.10 and 3.11 given the expected value
functions
• Households of age group x choose to adjust if and only if their idiosyncratic
adjustment utility shock τ < τ̃ x(e, a, h);
• The expected value functions are given by Equation 3.10 and 3.11;
• The evolution of the distribution of the households Γ is consistent with the
policy rules
I solve the equilibrium in the steady state. The expected value functions are
obtained through backward induction. The income dimension is naturally discrete,
so I have in total six value functions (2 age groups by 3 income levels) that are
approximated over the two continuous idiosyncratic states (a, h) using Chebyshev
polynomials. I approximate the ergodic distribution of households using a histogram
over a fine grid of (a, h).
3.3.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to annual frequency. I use standard values for a set of
conventional parameters. I set the households’ risk aversion rate / inverse of IES
γ = 2, the depreciation rate of housing δ = 0.1, the portion of pension as of wage
before retirement b = 0.7, and the down payment portion of mortgage ζ = 0.2. I set
the household’s discount factor β = 0.9 so that a significant portion of households
choose to borrow to finance their housing investment. I assign the share of non-
housing consumption φ = 0.8, consistent with the empirical share of expenditures on
goods and services other than housing out of total consumption in the US.
The life expectancy of US adults is about 78.6 years, which implies an average
death hazard of θd =
1
78.6−64 = 6.85% for the retired. In the US, about 13% of the
population’s age is 65 and above while the percentage of population who are between
18-64 is 63%. This implies the young-to-old hazard rate θo = 1.41%.
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The levels of the wage process is calibrated to the quintiles of the income distri-
bution of the US households. The low income group corresponds to the lowest two
quintiles, the middle group to the middle two quintiles and the high group to the
highest quintile. The asymmetry for the high group is meant to capture the excessive
curvature of the income distribution at the right tail. The Markov transition matrix
is calibrated such that the ergodic distribution of each group satisfy the weight of
the quintiles they correspond to and that the standard deviation of one-year income
change is 0.5 as reported by Guvenen et al. (2019).
I set the exogenous return on the risk free bond to be 0, lower than historical
average but consistent with the low interest environment the US has been in for the
last decade. The model is not stationary in the house price but is in its growth (Berger
et al., 2018). The house price growth is normalized to be 1. Finally, the parameter
that governs the magnitude of the non-convex adjustment cost τ̄ is assigned a value of
0.03. This translates to an average adjustment interval of 3.7 years for the households
in the steady state.
3.4 Consumption Response to Empirical House Price Dy-
namics
In this section, I combine the results from the two previous sections. Specifically, I
feed the empirical IRF of the average house price to an unexpected monetary policy
shock estimated in Section 3.2 into the structural model described in Section 3.3 and
calculate how the economy, especially the aggregate consumption, responds.
3.4.1 Unexpected House Price Shock
The IRF of the house price is introduced as an unexpected zero-possibility shock (or
MIT shock) to the model. The left panel of Figure 3·4 presents the IRF of ∆ log HPI
obtained in Section 3.2.3 concorded to annual frequency. Note that the series is in
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non-cumulative levels, which happens to fit well with the solution algorithm of the
model (see Berger et al., 2018, for details)3. The right panel of Figure 3·4 shows the
gross return on the risk free bond along the transition path, which is held constant. I
hold the gross real return constant on purpose to isolate the transmission of monetary
policy through housing, which is the purpose of this paper. Allowing the real return to
vary according to its empirical IRF can potentially confound the housing channel with
other important channels such as inter-temporal substitution channel and unhedged
interest exposure channel that have been extensively discussed in other work (see
Auclert, 2019) (also see Wong, 2019, for a discussion of the mortgage channel, which
is an example of the unhedged interest exposure channel).
I use backward induction to solve the policy rule from a distant steady state, and
simulate forward from time 1 when shock hits to obtain the transition path.
3.4.2 Transition Path of Aggregates
The transition path of main aggregate variables are present in Figure 3·5. The struc-
tural model is not stationary in house price but is so in house value (Berger et al.,
2018). Therefore, the house price never reverts back to its initial steady state level
after the shock, and the real house position increases permanently to compensate.
As expected, the negative price shock discourages spending on housing, pushing
down the aggregate value of house held by the households to about -4% below the
initial steady state at the trough before reverting back. In comparison, the impact
on consumption is relatively mild and lagging, but still the aggregate consumption
reaches a trough of -0.3% in five years. I will analyze this in more details in the next
subsection. With the decreasing house price pushing up the user cost of holding hous-
ing as well as tightening the budget constraint of the households along the transition
3More specifically, the model is not stationary in either house price or house stock, but rather is
stationary in the value of housing.
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Figure 3·4: Unexpected Shocks Fed to the Model
Note: Left panel shows empirical IRF of house price to 1% monetary policy shock concorded into
annual frequency. Data is in non-cumulative level. Right panel shows gross return on the risk free
bond along the transition path, which is held constant.
path, households choose to divest their housing positions and substitute towards the
risk free bond.
Due to the PE nature of the model, the marginal distribution of households over
the wage dimension is always in its ergodic distribution and therefore the average
wage is constant all along. The dampened capital return on housing reduces the
option value of adjusting, increasing the share of non-adjustors and decreasing the
average frequency of adjustment. The average adjustment interval goes from 3.7
years4 in the steady state to as many as 4.4 years one year after the shock. The
reduced adjustment frequency also helps increase households’ demand for the risk
free bond due to a precautionary saving motive.
4Average adjustment interval is calculated as 11−Share of Non-Adjustors
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3.4.3 Decomposition Into Three Channels
The transition path of aggregate variables masks important heterogeneity in the chan-
nels the house price shock manifests itself as well as the groups of households that
are most susceptible to these channels. I now decompose them one by one.
I first start by decomposing the aggregate dynamics into three main channels,
namely the wealth channel, the collateral channel and the substitution channel. In
the model, the reductions of the house price has three main ramifications. First, it
reduces the net worth of the household by decreasing the market value of the existing
housing stock. Second, it tightens the household’s borrowing constraint as it decreases
the collateral value of the new housing choice (see Equation 3.5). Third, it results in
substitution away or towards housing because housing is also a durable good. Each
of the three ramifications corresponds to one of the three channels respectively.
To formally separate the three channels, note that the policy function of a house-
hold along the transition path is determined by the household’s idiosyncratic states
as well as the perceived future path of the aggregate states. Take the policy function
of consumption as an example. Higher current income e and higher bond position
a both are likely to give higher consumption. While higher housing stock h would
correspond to higher c due to a wealth effect, it may also dampen consumption, for
housing is a substitute to consumption. In addition, because of the adjustment cost
and inter-temporal consumption smoothing motive, households are forward-looking
when choosing housing stock. Therefore, perceived future house prices affect current
housing choices and hence current consumption. Finally, since I will conduct counter-
factual analysis by adjusting the borrowing constraint, I also add the down payment
ratio ζ as an aggregate state. In a nutshell, current consumption can be written as
ct = c
(







5. In the steady state, css,t = c (et, at, ht | {1, ζ}∀τ ).
First, to isolate the wealth channel, consider a series of repeated lump sum trans-
fers that mimic the changes in household wealth as a result of the house price dynamics
while keeping the current and expected future aggregate states constant. Let
cw,t = c (et, at + Tt, ht | {1, ζ}∀τ )
Tt = htPh,t−1(1− δ)(gPh,t − 1)
(3.13)
I then define the wealth channel as cw,t − css,t. Next, to isolate the collateral
channel, I manipulate the down-payment ratio ζ to mimic the adjustment of the
household’s borrowing constraint as a result of the price dynamics. Formally, let
cc,t = c
(











I then define the collateral channel as cc,t− cw,t. Finally, the substitution channel
is defined as ct − cc,t. Basic algebra shows that the deviation of consumption off the
steady state value along the transition path is simply the sum of the wealth channel,
the collateral channel, and the substitution channel. I use the transition path of
the distribution of households over the idiosyncratic states in the baseline case to
aggregate individual policy choices. I apply the same logic to the policy function of
housing as well and plot the decompositions in Figure 3·6. The black solid line with
circles shows the aggregate path, corresponding to their counterparts in Figure 3·5.
The blue solid line with crosses depicts the wealth channel. Intuitively, the decreasing
5Since the model is not stationary in Ph, it is the growth rate of the house price rather than its
level that is the aggregate state. Please refer to Berger et al. (2018) for details.
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house price tightens the budget constraint of the household and therefore dampens
both housing and consumption choices. The red solid line with dots corresponds to
the collateral channel. Tightened borrowing constraint forces households to choose
a smaller house. Households compensate their utility loss by increasing their non-
housing consumption. The substitution channel is given by the green solid line with
“x”. The drop in the house price does not immediately result in a surge in housing
purchase, as the house value moves almost in lock step with the house price in the
first two years. This is because the option value of purchasing a new house decreases
sharply upon the shock as households expect the house price to continue to drop.
Three years after the shock, the housing purchase in its absolute amount begins to
pick up to compensate the loss in house value due to the house price drop.
In terms of sheer magnitude, the decomposition shows that the wealth channel is
the most important in shaping the aggregate non-housing consumption, accounting for
over 0.23% decrease two years after the shock, while the other two channels contribute
to the rest. However, this observation on the aggregate masks important heterogeneity
among the households. Previous work has discussed heterogeneity due to income,
asset positions, and marginal propensity to consume (Kaplan, Moll, et al., 2018;
Berger et al., 2018; Wong, 2019). In the next chapter, I focus on an alternative
dimension: the willingness to adjust their housing position.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity by Willingness to Adjust
Recall that each period a household faces an idiosyncratic utility shock whenever
they decides to change their housing stock. The optimal solution dictates that the
household should adjust if and only if their utility shock is below a certain thresh-
old. Therefore, those that choose to adjust (adjustors) can be interpreted as being
relatively willing to do so than those that choose not to (non-adjustors).
In Figure 3·7, I re-plot the transition path of the aggregate housing value and
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consumption as well as their decompositions by the adjustment status. The first
row depicts the conditional mean choices of the adjustors, while the second row cor-
responds to the non-adjustors. To control for composition changes, I fix an initial
steady state distribution over the idiosyncratic states when calculating the conditional
means for each adjustment status group. Again, the black solid line with circles shows
the aggregate. An immediate observation is that the two groups of households be-
have very differently in response to the house price shock. Starting with the housing
choices, it is obvious that the adjustors reduce their new housing choice aggressively.
Decomposition reveals that this is largely due to the collateral channel: the tightened
borrowing constraint significantly limits the size of the new house. On the contrary,
the non-adjustors’ average housing choice responds vastly more mildly, reducing only
by less than 0.7% in the trough compared to about 5% for the adjustors. In fact, the
value of the non-adjustors’ housing decreases only due to the drop in the house price,
as they do not adjust their housing stock by definition. Hence, only the substitution
channel contributes to the drop in their housing value.
In regard to consumption choices, the two groups of households exhibit behavior
that are almost exactly the opposite. The average consumption of the adjustors
increases by about 0.3% upon the shock, whereas that of the non-adjustors decreases
by about 0.2%. Decomposition shows that the difference is largely due to the collateral
channel. Because of the reduced housing choices as the borrowing constraint tightens,
the adjusting households instead compensate their utility loss by increasing their
non-housing consumption. To see this, note the marginal utility of consumption is
decreasing in housing as long as γ > 1 (see Equation 3.15). Households have a
higher marginal utility of consumption when reducing their housing choice. More
generally, if the consumption compound is not Cobb-Douglas but instead is CES in
consumption and housing, the sufficient condition becomes γ > 1
σ
, where σ is the
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elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing. As Berger et al. (2018)
points out, most existing empirical literature gives estimate of σ around 1, while in
macroeconomics the choice of γ is usually greater or equal to 1. Therefore, I would
expect the direction of the collateral channel on the consumption of adjustors to
be robust under reasonable parameter choices. On the other hand, the collateral
channel is almost exactly the opposite for the non-adjustors. This is because the
non-adjustors have to bear the deteriorating credit capacity due to the tightened
borrowing constraint and reduce their spending on non-housing consumption.
uc(c, h) = φc
(1−γ)φ−1h(1−γ)(1−φ) (3.15)
In aggregate, the increase in the consumption of the adjustors dominates. Readers
should keep in mind that the willingness to adjust is not a permanent type. It is even
not persistent as the distribution of the idiosyncratic utility shock is i.i.d. Therefore,
the current adjustment status does not alter a household’s future behavior very much.
However, if I were to model the adjustment status as a persistent state, I would expect
even larger heterogeneity in the behavior of the the two groups of households.
3.4.5 Possible Policy Intervention
In this subsection, I consider a specific policy, which I refer to as “lean-against-the-
wind”, that can be implemented by the Federal Reserve to stabilize the aggregate
consumption along the transition path. Specifically, the Federal Reserve targets the
real interest rate such that it matches the price changes in housing one-on-one. For-
mally,
rt = α∆ logPh,t (3.16)
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with the sensitivity parameter α = 16. According to Equation 3.5, this “lean-
against-the-wind” policy is able to completely offsets the adjustment of budget con-
straints due to changes in the house price.
The effect of this policy on aggregates is given in the first row of Figure 3·8.
Remarkably, this policy dramatically stabilizes the aggregate dynamics along the
transition path. The changes in aggregate housing holding are largely muted, while
the drops in aggregate consumption is cut by more than half. The second and third
row depicts the transition paths of the conditional averages conditional on the ad-
justment status. The drops in the real interest rate relieve the borrowing constraint,
motivating households to purchase a larger house and spend less on consumption.
On the other hand, the relaxed budget constraints allow the non-adjustors to borrow
more to finance their consumption.
6Note that this policy also has unintended income effect as it changes interest income/payments.
To correct for this, I also introduce a transfer that compensates the households for their interest
income loss/surplus.
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Figure 3·5: Transition Path of Main Aggregate Variables
Note: Blue solid curve shows the transition path of the variable of interest. Black dotted line
shows the steady state level. All variables are present in percentage deviations from the steady
state except for the share of non-adjustors, which is shown in level.
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Figure 3·6: Decomposition of Main Aggregates: Housing and Con-
sumption
Note: The black solid line with circles is the aggregate. The blue solid line with crosses is the
wealth effect, the red solid line with dots is the collateral channel and the green solid line with ”x”
is the substitution channel. The three channels add up to the aggregate.
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Figure 3·7: Decomposition of Main Aggregates by Adjustment Status:
Housing and Consumption
Note: The black solid line with circles is the aggregate. The blue solid line with crosses is the
wealth effect, the red solid line with dots is the collateral channel and the green solid line with ”x”
is the substitution channel. The three channels add up to the aggregate.
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Figure 3·8: Transition Path of Aggregates and Conditionals With
Policy Intervention
Note: Blue solid curve with dots shows the transition path of aggregates in the baseline. Red solid
curve with crosses show the transition path of aggregates with policy intervention. Black dotted
line shows the steady state level. All variables are present in percentage deviations from the steady
state except for the shares of each group, which is shown in level.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I measure the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption through
housing by integrating standard econometric tools and a structural model with hous-
ing. Using a canonical SVAR model and quarterly US data, I estimate that a 1%
unexpected rise in the Federal Fund Rate would robustly lead to around 1.4% drop
in house price in two years, with sluggish adjustment still proceeding later and house
price eventually stabilizing at 1.8% permanent loss. I then feed the impulse response
of the house price to an incomplete market model with housing and non-convex hous-
ing adjustment to compute the effect of the house price changes on aggregate con-
sumption. Overall, the aggregate consumption is driven off the steady state level by
as much as 0.3%. The aggregate dynamics is shaped by three major channels: the
wealth channel, the collateral channel and the substitution channel. The wealth chan-
nel dictates in the aggregate, accounting for two thirds of the loss in the non-housing
consumption.
Yet there is substantial heterogeneity in households’ response to the tightened
borrowing constraint as a result of the dropping house price conditional on their ad-
justment status. The adjustors would aggressively reduce their housing positions as
the collateral value of the house decreases while raising non-housing consumption to
compensate for the the utility loss. The non-adjustors choose to bear the tightened
borrowing constraint by reducing their non-housing consumption. In the aggregate,
the adjustors dominate. A “lean-against-the-wind” policy by the Federal Reserve
that matches the real interest rate with the house price change can relieve the bor-
rowing constraint of the households and therefore greatly stabilizes the aggregate




A.1 Data and Empirics
A.1.1 Data source
The major data source I use is the China Database of Above-Scaled Industrial Firms.
The database consists of firm level information for all state-owned firms and non-
state-owned firms, including private firms and joint ventures, that have annual sales
of above 5 million yuan which is about US$400k according to then exchange rate.
This selection constitutes the definition of the “above-scaled”. The selection is not
perfect though, with rare cases where one firm meets the five million threshold one
year and misses the other but still appears in the database nonetheless. The firms in
the data base contributes about 70% of total industrial value added over the sample
period. The database covers three major sectors, manufacturing, mining and utilities,
with the bulk of firms being manufacturing. For the purpose of this project, I keep
only the manufacturing sector. The database ranges from year 1998-2007. Data after
2007 is available up until 2013, but there is a major revision in the list of accounts to
be collected in 2008, making calculation of key variable impossible thereafter. So I
stop at 2007. I am able to observe key financial information, including major accounts
in balance sheet and income statement, and key administrative information such as
name, location, industry and number of employees for each firm. I link firms over the
years using a modified version of the method in Brandt et al. (2014). The resulting
unbalanced panel has over 130k firms in 1998 to a bit shy of 300k in 2007.
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A second data source I use is the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.
Complemented with a proprietary concordance table, I am able to get 4-digit industry
level deflators for capital investment, output shipment and material input. The rest
of the miscellaneous data are mainly collected from the China National Bureau of
Statistics (CNBS) and various statistic yearbooks it has published.
A.1.2 Construction of Data Series in Section 1.2
Data in Figure
1·5
In Figure 1·5, the horizontal axis represents the frequency of capital substitution
and expansion. These are calculated by aggregating firm level indicator functions
for each type of episode weighted by firm employment at the province level. The
frequency is calculated for the year 2004. The vertical axis represents the shift-share
version of the percentage change in skilled labor share. In particular, the shares are
average shares of manufacturing employment at 2-digit industry (or simply sector)
level for each province in 1998, and the shift is national growth of skilled-to-unskilled
labor ratio for each sector calculated from the two waves of economic census conducted








γp,t is the shift-share skilled labor share for province p and in year t. ωj,p,98 is the
employment share of a sector j in province p in three years before the WTO accession.
hj,t (lj,t) is the nation-wide employment of skilled (unskilled) labor for sector j in year
t. Skilled labor is defined as workers with at least some degree of college and unskilled




The plots in Figure 1·4 is the result of a regression that aims at tracing out dy-





βτ1 {ip,s,j,t+τ == 1}+ δt + δp,s + εp,s,j,t (A.2)
yp,s,j,t is an assortment of firm level statistics, such as firm level capital, for a firm
j in province p and sector s and year t. ip,s,j,t+τ is a firm level indicator function and
it equals 1 if τ years away (in year t+τ) there is a capital substitution episode. δt is a
non-parametric time fixed effect, and δp,s is a province− by − sector non-parametric
fixed effect. To mitigate measurement errors and pollution of sample due to quick in
and out of firms, I restrict the sample to firms that appear at least four years in the
database. The special operator ∆cs on the LHS represents value relative to that in
a capital substitution episode. For example, suppose a firm is observed to conduct
capital substitution in year 2004, then, ∆csyp,s,j,t = yp,s,j,t − yp,s,j,04. For firms that
conduct multiple capital substitution in the sample, I create pseudo series for each
episode. The result is robust to only accounting for the first capital substitution
event. Indicators six years and above away from the capital substitution are grouped
at two ends, and also controlled for in the regression but not shown in the figure. The
regression is estimated using average employment as weights, and standard errors are
clustered at province level. Using uniform weights yield very similar patterns.
On the left hand, the assortment of firm level measures include real capital, total
employment, real capital to total employment, nominal payroll to nominal sales, real
sales per worker and real sales. Real capital is calculated using the perpetual inventory
method and real sales is calculated as nominal sales to the average nominal sales of
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firms in the same sector in the same year all over China..
A.1.3 Demand Shock and Intensive Margin of Capital Substitution
Table A.1 shows results for the intensity measures, namely the weighted mean of the
Davis-Halitwanger style factor adjustment rates conditional on capital substitution.
Column 2 and 4 show the IV results for investment rate and employment growth rate
respectively. Based on the two columns, it appears that capital substitution become
more acute following a rise in demand. The capital investment rate conditional on
capital substitution increases and the conditional employment growth rate becomes
even more negative. Moving from the 1st quantile to the 3rd quantile of the 3-year
investment growth rate explains 73% of the increase in the conditional investment
rate. On the other hand, the same inter-quantile variation explains 67% of the re-
duction in the employment growth rate. Such variations correspond to about 30%
increase and 31% drop relative to the respective mean of the factor adjustment rates.
The results imply that there are compensating responses in the intensive margin that
work against the reduction in the extensive margin, but the magnitude is only about
a quarter of that of the extensive margin.
A.1.4 Projection
In order to check if the patterns seen in the previous section is persistent, I use a
projection method to investigate firms’ dynamic responses to trade exposure. The
benchmark projection regression I use is as follow,
∆h3yp,s,t =∆3xp,s,tβ





∆h3yp,s,t =yp,s,t+h − yp,s,t−3
(A.3)
The superscript h denotes projection for h periods ahead. h = 0 corresponds to
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conditional investment rate conitional employment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
log(Exports) -0.011* 0.18*** 0.011** -0.087**
(0.0068) (0.061) (0.0045) (0.036)
Cluster Province Province Province Province
FE: Yr, Cell, Trend Yr, Cell, Trend Yr, Cell, Trend Yr, Cell, Trend
Weights Emp Emp Emp Emp
IQR: y 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.09
IQR: x 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
N obs 3584 3584 3584 3584
Table A.1: Second Stage, Foreign Demand Intensifies Capital Substi-
tution
Note: S.E. in parentheses, clustered at province level; star levels: * ¡ 0.1, ** ¡ 0.05, *** ¡ 0.01; fixed
effects include year fixed effect, cell fixed effect and linear cell time trends which appear as cell
fixed effects in log differences; IQR:y(x) represents the inter-quantile range for the dependent
(independent) variable. The first two columns show results for average investment rate conditional
on firms conducting Capital Upgrading; the last two columns show results for average employment
growth rate conditional on firms conducting Capital Upgrading; log(exports) is the log of total real
exports by all firms in a province-by-sector-by-year cell which is instrumented by the Bartik.
the benchmark regression in the previous section. Again, the independent variable is
the three-year log growth of aggregate real local exports for each province−by−sector
cell in each year instrumented by the three year difference of the Bartik1. βh can be
regarded as the regional elasticity2 of the dependent variable in response to the trade
exposure h years ahead in the future. The results are presented concisely in a series of
empirical Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) that extend the benchmark regression
1This projection model is similar to that used in Chen (2019) to study regional fiscal multipliers,
and the application here possesses a close analogy.
2Elasticity if the dependent variable is in log; pseudo-elasticity if otherwise
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results, as shown in Figure A·1. The dark blue dots represent the point estimates of
the projection regressions, and the light blue ribbon represents the 95% confidence
intervals for each estimate. Due to limited observations, the standard errors always
become exceptionally large for the last year of estimation.
The first row of Figure A·1 extends the main results of the frequency measures,
and the second row the intensity measures. The first estimates (year = 1) are exactly
the respective benchmark results. The main takeaway is that the reduction in the
frequency of Capital Upgrading extends about three years into the future, which
then fades away in the 4th year. On the other hand, the dynamic responses along
the intensive dimension are largely muted as well.
Figure A·1: Empirical IRFs
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A.2 Proof of Propositions
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition
3
After capital upgrading, there are two effects, the scale effect through changes in
demand shock ∆ν and change in λ due to ζx x ∈ {k, l}, and the substitution effect
through ζx x ∈ {k, l} directly. Now consider the value of change in demand shifter
that makes the scale effect zero in net, denoted by ∆ṽ. In that case, the net change
in capital must be positive and the net change in unskilled labor negative. Then
consider adjusting demand shifter to ∆v̄ so that the net change in capital is zero. It
must be the case that ∆v̄ − ∆ṽ < 0. Since the scale effect is symmetric to capital
and unskilled labor, it naturally follows that unskilled labor growth is negative at
∆v̄. Note skilled labor is proportional to capital, so it’s net adjustment is zero as
well. So over all, labor adjustment is negative while capital adjustment is zero at ∆v̄.
Then it follows that any value ∆v ∈ (∆v̄, ∆v̄ + ε) for a small enough ε > 0 would
result in positive capital adjustment and negative labor adjustment, and hence the
existence of capital substitution. Because it is assumed that the PDF of ν is above
zero everywhere, P (∆v ∈ (∆v̄, ∆v̄ + ε)) > 0.
The fraction of firms exhibit capital substitution depends on the magnitude of ad-
justment of the factor augmenting technologies. Since firms always choose the newest
vintage when upgrading, the older the vintage is, the more intense the adjustment
of factor augmenting productivities are, and hence the higher the fraction of firms
exhibiting capital substitution.




Note that I use average sales per worker as the labor productivity. As a result, the



































































, which is the share of machinery in total expenditure,







= 1− sm, and sm strictly increases following
a capital upgrade.






















following a capital upgrade. The interpretation is simple, I need marginal output
of skilled labor be at least as high as the unskilled. Trivially true if in competitive
market and wH > wL.
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Part 2
The labor share in the model is given by Equation A.4. Given the elasticity of
substitution between capital and unskilled labor is greater than 1, the labor share is
increasing in ζl and decreasing in ζk. Since ζl decreases and ζk increases after a firm























The steady state distribution of firms over τ follows geometric distribution with prob-
ability µ. Higher µ, the more rightward skewed the distribution is. Since the capital
to unskilled labor ratio is strictly decreasing in τ , hence the higher µ, the higher the
overall capital to unskilled labor ratio, and so is the skilled to unskilled labor ratio.
A.3 Quantitative Model and Its Solution
A.3.1 Solution Algorithm for Steady State
I solve the model in steady state. The solution algorithm is a combination of guess-
and-verify and extended Newton’s Method.
1. guess the triplet of {WH , WL, Yf}
2. solve the intermediate firm’s problem given the guess
3. use intermediate firms’ policy function to obtain the ergodic distribution, and
use it to obtain the aggregate demand for both types of labor Hd and Ld, and
aggregate investment expense I and subsequently consumption C
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4. use the consumption and wage guess to obtain labor supplies Hs and Ls from
household FOCs
5. use the ergodic distribution to compute the distribution of firm prices {Pj}j
and then obtain the aggregate price Pf
6. evaluate the accuracy of the guess using {Hs −Hd, Ls − Ld, Pf − 1}. Each is
increasing in the corresponding element of the trio
7. if the residuals are small enough, stop; otherwise, use an extended Newton’s
Method to obtain a new guess and repeat 1-6
I use Chebyshev polynomial to approximate the value function V̄ over the state
space K and z, and discretize the value function over the τ space. Using a coarse
state grid of 360 points for value function iteration and a fine grid of 9000 for ergodic
distribution, I obtain the steady state solution in around 5 minutes.
A.3.2 Calculate The Transition Path
The algorithm for solving the transition path is a standard one, which I briefly discuss
here.
1. calculate the steady states before and after the demand shock and choose a time
period long enough. In this case, T = 30
2. guess a complete transition path of a four-element vector, namely {wH,t, wL,t, yf,t, ct}Tt=1;
use the wages and output to calculate the static choice for each year along the
transition path, and use the consumption to calculate the stochastic discount
factor
3. starting from the last year and assuming the value function will has approached
the new steady state, calculate backwards the path of value functions and policy
functions
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4. then starting from the first year and using the benchmark ergodic distribution
as the initial distribution of firms, simulate forwards a path of the distribution
of firms
5. use the path of distribution to calculate aggregate values, and compare them
with the guess. If accurate enough, stop; otherwise, use an extended Newton’s
Method to search for a new guess and repeat 2-5
Using the same grids as in the calculation of the steady state, am able to obtain
the solution for the transition path in around 2 hours using a 16-core computer.
A.4 Model Appendix
Our empirical results so far have established that preexisting exposure to manufactur-
ing is economically and statistically significantly associated with house price growth
across locations, more so at the bottom of the housing distribution. As we formally
show below with the help of a simple model, these effects rise naturally if (i) re-
gions are heterogenous in their exposure to the manufacturing sector (as depicted
in Figure 2·1), (ii) and manufacturing workers, who have experienced worse labor
market outcomes than non-manufacturing workers, live disproportionately in lower-
priced houses. In what follows, we first present the model and then present empirical
evidence consistent with its key assumptions.
Consider an environment that consists of two regions, A and B that are of equal
working population size, normalized to 1. In each region there are two equal sized
housing segments, low (L) and high (H); i.e. half of the population lives in L-type
houses, the rest in H types. The only difference across the two regions is the share
of the working population that works at the manufacturing sector: let PopMFGA >
PopMFGB . All manufacturing workers, irrespective of the region they live in, earn the
same income, Y MFG, while non-manufacturing workers earn Y Other.
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Let the fraction of manufacturing workers who live in the L segment be given by
α
2
PopMFGA . The three cases for α are given by
α =

1 manufacturing workers are equally distributed across the two segments
> 1 manufacturing workers are disproportionally housed in the L segment
< 1 manufacturing workers are disproportionally housed in the H segment



























The same two equations hold in Region B with the proper modifications to the sub-
scripts.
Assume that there is a log-linear mapping between the change in income of those
workers who live in a given segment and the segment’s equilibrium housing price. It
then suffices to analyze the variations in the incomes of the two segments (L and H),
in the two locations (A and B), i.e YA,L, YA,H , YB,L, YB,H . Let hatted variables denote
the percentage deviations and assume that Ŷ MFG < Ŷ Other = 0. Then, log-linearizing
the income of each of the four categories yields
ŶRegion,Segment = XRegion,Segment × Ŷ MFG
where Region ∈ {A,B}, Segment ∈ {L,H}, and XRegion,Segment are functioning of
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the model’s coefficients.3
Our empirical facts can be easily mapped to the following three relations between
the coefficients. First, a sufficient condition for larger movements (in absolute terms)
in regions with higher exposure to manufacturing (recall that the share of the man-
ufacturing sector is bigger in region A), is that XA,L > XB,L and XA,H > XB,H ,
in which case region A sees a bigger fall in labor income. These conditions are de
facto satisfied given that PopMFGA > Pop
MFG
B . Below we show indeed that areas with
higher pre-exposure to manufacturing exhibited lower wage and employment growth
over our period of interest.
Second, the relative size of cross-sectional differences for the lower part of the
house price distribution maps into (XA,L −XB,L) > (XA,H −XB,H). This condition
holds if α > 1. That is, that manufacturing workers are not equally distributed
across the two segments; rather they are disproportionately represented in the L part
of the housing distribution. In this case, the lower quality housing segment exhibits
a higher cross sectional variance. Below we show indeed that manufacturing workers
are disproportionately represented in the lowest tercile of the housing distribution.
Exposure to Manufacturing and Labor Market Outcomes Table 3 leverages
the Census IPUMS micro data, demonstrating that manufacturing-heavy areas expe-

































































Column (1) reveals that average wages in a highly exposed area at the 75th percentile
of manufacturing shares in 2000 grew by 0.495 × 7.1 ≈ 3.5% less each year over 2001-
06 than in a manufacturing-light region at the 25th percentile, a difference equal to
32% of the overall IQR of wage growth across regions. Using the same comparison,
column (2) shows that the likelihood of an individual not working grew by 0.295 × 7.1
≈ 2.1% more in that same CZ, equal to 56% of the IQR of non-employment growth.
Column (3) shows that the likelihood of working in manufacturing fell by 0.141 × 7.1
≈ 1.0% more, equal to 56% of the IQR of growth in the share of manufacturing work.
Column (4) shows that the likelihood of working in construction was not precisely
different in the manufacturing-heavy region. Column (5) documents that the likeli-
hood of working in all other sectors fell by 0.157 × 7.1 ≈ 1.1% more, equal to 33% of
the IQR of the growth in the share of all other work. Note that by construction the
sum of the coefficients in columns (2) - (5) must be zero.
To summarize, individuals in manufacturing-heavy areas at the start of our period
experienced lower average wage growth, a higher likelihood of non-employment, a
lower likelihood of working in manufacturing, no increased likelihood of working in
the alternative construction sector, and a declining likelihood of work in all other
sectors.
Manufacturing Workers and House Price Tiers Figure A·2 in our appendix,
drawn from an analysis of self-reported housing values versus labor market status in
the Census micro data, documents the housing market segmentation in the data.4 The
fraction of manufacturing workers is highest in the low-value housing segment, and the
fraction declines for each step up towards higher tiers of homes. Hence, as is evident
from the Figure A·2, manufacturing workers are disproportionately represented in the
lowest tercile of the housing distribution.
4We do not have information in the Zillow dataset regarding the occupation of the sellers.
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Figure A·2: Manufacturing Works by House Price Tercile
Note: For a given house price tercile, the figure plots the distribution across commuting zones of
the share of manufacturing workers living in that house price category. The underlying data is the
US Census IPUMS microdata in the year 2000.
To summarize, the empirical patterns we show in this paper fail to reject a theoret-
ical model in which manufacturing exposure causes reduced income and employment
growth, feeding into declines in the price of both homes overall and especially the
price of the lowest-value homes.
A.5 Data Appendix
We use five distinct sources of data in the paper. Table A.2 in this appendix provides
descriptive statistics on the relevant outcomes used in the paper.
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Zillow ZTRAX Our baseline house price data is drawn from the Zillow ZTRAX
micro dataset, used under agreement with Zillow. This dataset contains two main
files: a set of transactions records with property identifiers and sale prices and a set of
property-level tax assessments with various housing characteristics recorded including
the property ZIP code. The combined data features broad geographic coverage and
around 80 million home transactions. We focus on single-family homes, in commuting
zones with more than a minimum number of observations. We take two approaches
to computing CZ-level or CZ × housing segment-level growth rates in average prices.
Our first approach relies on hedonic regressions run only on the year-2001 portion
of our sample. In particular, we estimate
ph,2001 = k′Xh + δZIP (h) + εh,2001.
Above, ph is the log price of property h and Xh is a vector of home characteristics
including the log square footage, the property age, the total number of rooms, bed-
rooms, and bathrooms, the number of stories, and an indicator for the presence of
a garage. δZIP (h) is a full set of ZIP code-level fixed effects. Then, for any property
h sold in a later year t, the hedonically adjusted price of property h on a year-2001
basis is the predicted value from the specification above. For each CZ or each CZ ×
housing segment cell, we then compute the mean value of the hedonically adjusted
prices of homes sold in that cell. Our main house price specifications in Table 1 and
2 use the annualized growth rate of these average prices as the main outcome.
Our second approach relies on a repeat sales method. For each CZ or each CZ ×
housing segment cell, we select the sample of properties in that cell which sold more
than once in our period of interest. We then compute the annualized growth rate of
the price based on the earliest and latest transactions over this period. The median
house price growth rate in a particular cell forms our outcome of interest for Table
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A.4 in this appendix.
For all homes in our ZTRAX analysis, we map properties to commuting zones by
ZIP code.
US Census IPUMS The US Census provides IPUMS micro data extracts based
on anonymized samples of the decennial Census as well as the annual American
Community Survey (ACS). Sampling weights are provided for each individual person-
level record. For our calculations of pre-existing manufacturing employment shares as
well as the other labor market controls including the local routine share, the share of
college educated workers, the share of female workers, and the share of immigrants in
the year 2000, we rely on the year-2000 decennial Census extract. To map employment
to routine vs non-routine categories, we rely on the mapping in Jaimovich et al.
(2020). For the growth of wages, employment, the likelihood of not working, the
likelihood of working in manufacturing, the likelihood of working in construction, and
the likelihood of working in all other sectors, we rely on the annual ACS extracts.
For housing values in the IPUMS data, we use self-reported home values conditional
upon homeownership.
To compute CZ-level aggregates for any outcome of interest, we map the US
Census’ Public Use Microdata Areas or PUMAs to CZ’s using the mappings provided
by David Dorn.
FHFA Home Price Indexes The Federal Housing Finance Agency publishes
county-level home prices indexes, which we map to CZ’s using the geographical cor-
respondences on David Dorn’s website. Taking averages of growth rates in a given
period across counties in a CZ provides a CZ-level measure of house price growth ac-
cording to this data source. Table A.3 in this appendix reports house price regressions
based on these FHFA house price growth measures.
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Saiz (2010) Housing Supply Elasticities As a control at the local level, we use
the Saiz (2010) measure of local housing supply elasticities. For regions in which
this housing supply elasticity is not available, we use the predicted housing supply
elasticity based on the associated Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index
(WRLURI) value and projections of the local housing supply elasticity on the WR-
LURI for an overlapping sample.
Survey of Consumer Finances To compute the share of home values as a frac-
tion of total assets for US households, we analyze the micro data from the 2001,
2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016 waves of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finances. These micro datasets provide a range of line items on household balance
sheets, together with sample weighting to allow for the formation of representative
statistics. We aggregate household assets across line items into multiple categories:
the reported value of the primary residence, the reported value of all other proper-
ties, equity in private businesses or partnerships, equity in owned vehicles, demand
accounts, direct equity and bond holdings, pension and other retirement assets, and
all other miscellaneous assets. The mean ratio of the value of the primary residence
to total assets, both for the sample of homeowners as well as for the full sample of US
households, are quite stable across survey waves at around 60% and 40% respectively.
These numbers are reported in the main text.
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Panel A: Zillow Microdata on Home Characteristics in 2001
Variable Mean Median IQR Year N
Sales Price ($) 272638 149000 144200 2001 2676821
Square Feet 1854 1644 962 2001 2676821
Age 27.2 20 43 2001 2676821
Total Rooms 4 1 6 2001 2676821
Bathrooms 4.48 5 3 2001 2676821
Bedrooms 3.47 4 1 2001 2676821
Garage 0.49 0 1 2001 2676821
Panel B: Commuting Zone Outcomes, House Price Sample
Mean Median IQR Years N
House Price Growth 0.0809 0.0776 0.0699 2001-06 179
Low-Value House Price Growth 0.0781 0.0835 0.0874 2001-06 179
Mid-Value House Price Growth 0.0797 0.0737 0.0854 2001-06 178
High-Value House Price Growth 0.0805 0.0751 0.0730 2001-06 178
Low-Value House Price Growth 0.0102 0.0158 0.0326 2001-15 179
Mid-Value House Price Growth 0.0214 0.0254 0.0270 2001-15 178
High-Value House Price Growth 0.0320 0.0329 0.0229 2001-15 178
Manufacturing Share of Employment 0.0966 0.0904 0.0671 2000 179
Routine Share of Employment 0.1493 0.1469407 0.02763785 2000 179
College Educated Working Share 0.5034 0.5160 0.1224 2000 179
Female Working Share 0.5118 0.5136 0.0214 2000 179
Foreign Working Share 0.0864 0.0574 0.0716 2000 179
Housing Supply Elasticity 2.2996 2.2808 0.9688 - 179
Panel C: Commuting Zone Outcomes, Labor Market Sample
Mean Median IQR Years N
Wage Growth 0.1715 0.1636 0.1084 2001-06 741
Change in Not Working Share -0.0887 -0.0871 0.0373 2001-06 741
Change in Manufacturing Work Share 0.0030 0.0025 0.0193 2001-06 741
Change in Construction Wprl Share 0.0259 0.0241 0.0149 2001-06 741
Change in Other Work Share 0.0102 0.0158 0.0326 2001-06 741
Manufacturing Share of Employment 0.0851 0.0779 0.0709 2000 741
Routine Share of Employment 0.1525 0.1495 0.0284 2000 741
College Educated Working Share 0.4646 0.4632 0.1215 2000 741
Female Working Share 0.5071 0.5100 0.0235 2000 741
Foreign Working Share 0.0568 0.0372 0.0471 2000 741
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Note: The top panel reports various descriptive statistics from the Zillow house price transaction
sample in 2001. The middle panel reflects the aggregate commuting zone house price sample. The
bottom panel reflects the aggregate commuting zone labor market sample. This data is based on
aggregated values from the Zillow house price data as well as US Census IPUMS microdata. The
housing supply elasticity is drawn from Saiz (2010).
124
Percent Change in House Prices (1) (2) (3)
Sample FHFA FHFA Zillow
Manufacturing Share -0.379*** -0.387*** -0.444***
(0.073) (0.085) (0.080)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Census Division Census Division
Commuting Zone Observations 657 657 179
Years 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.708 0.715
Table A.3: FHFA House Prices and Manufacturing
Note: Regressions run at the commuting zone level with the average percentage house price growth
from the FHFA over 2001-06 on the manufacturing employment share in 2000. The first two
columns are estimated on the FHFA sample, while the third column restricts to the sample covered
by the Zillow ZTRAX dataset. Controls include the Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity, the
percent of routine cognitive jobs, the college educated working share, the female working share,
and the foreign working share. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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* House Price Tercile (0.032)
Manufacturing Share -0.229***
* Low-Value Houses (0.071)
Manufacturing Share -0.032
* Mid-Value Houses (0.055)
Manufacturing Share 0.015
* High-Value Houses (0.055)
Controls Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Census Division Census Division
Underlying House Transactions 909780 909780
Commuting Zone x Tercile Obs. 132 132
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51
Table A.4: Repeat Sale House Prices and Manufacturing across the
Distribution
Note: Regressions run at the commuting zone x house price tercile level with the percent change in
average house prices for the relevant cell on the manufacturing employment share in 2000. The
terciles reflect 2001 home values. Controls include the Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity, the
percent of routine cognitive jobs, the college educated working share, the female working share,
and the foreign working share. Only commuting zones with at least 200 observations and terciles
with at least 50 are used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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A.6 Robustness Check for Empirical Part
In this section, I show that the impulse response of HPI estimated in Section 3.2 is
robust under alternative setups. In Figure A·3, I plot the baseline IRF of HPI as the
dark blue solid line and its 95% confidence interval as the shade. I then progressively
remove the seasonal dummies (red), the linear trend (green), and the constant (blue).
Obviously, the pattern in the baseline result is well preserved under these alternative
specifications.
Figure A·3: Impulse Response Functions to a 100 bp Monetary Policy
Shock
Note: CEE setup. All series are cumulative changes of their log differences except for the FFR.
The 95% confidence intervals are estimated via bootstrapping. The RPCE is a real private
consumption expenditure series that cover everything; the RGDP is a real GDP index; the HPI is
a nominal housing price index; the CPI is a inflation measure on all consumptions by US urban
residents; the FFR is the effective Federal Fund Rate; and the M2 is a simply a measure of M2.
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Elbourne (2008) provides an alternative setup of the structural matrices, which
is more flexible and involves MLE to obtain an estimation. My result is robust in a
similar setup like his as well. Details can be obtained upon request.
A.7 Robustness Check of Models
In this section, I show that the transition dynamics of main aggregates, namely the
value of house and non-housing consumption, are robust to perturbations of several
calibrated parameters. The first parameter I perturb is the risk free rate in the steady
state. In the baseline case, I set the risk free rate to be 0%, lower than historical
mean, but consistent with the low interest environment the US has been in for the
past decade. A higher interest rate would incentivize households to hold less housing,
and therefore less susceptible to the house price shock. In Figure A·4, I plot two
alternative specifications. The red solid line with crosses correspond to an economy
with 1% interest rate, while the green solid line with dots to a -% interest rate. As
expected, the economy with a higher interest rate responds less dramatically, but the
difference is mild.
The second parameter I perturb is the down-payment ratio ζ. A higher ζ tightens
the borrowing constraint and makes households choose a smaller house. This reduces
the household leverage and should buffer them from the price change. Figure A·5 plots
two alternative specifications. The red solid curve with crosses shows an alternative
specification with ζ = 0.22, while the green solid curve with dots has ζ = 0.18. The
two alternatives are virtually indistinguishable.
Finally, I perturb the parameter that governs the non-convex housing adjustment
cost τ̄ . In the baseline, τ̄ = 0.03, which generates an average adjustment interval
of 3.7 years. The red solid curve with crosses has τ̄ = 0.035, corresponding to an
average adjustment interval of 4.0 years. The green solid line with dots has τ̄ = 0.025,
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Figure A·4: Robustness Check: Steady State Rf
Note: Blue solid curve with dots shows the transition path of the baseline where the steady state
rf ≡ (Rf − 1)× 100 = 0. Red solid curve with crosses shows the transition path of an alternative
economy with steady state rf = 1%. Green solid curve with solid dot shows that of an alternative
with steady state rf = −1%. All variables are present in percentage deviations from the steady
state.
corresponding to an average adjustment interval of 3.3 years. A higher adjustment
interval increases the collateral constraint on the non-adjustors, and should decrease
the consumption response. But it discourages households to take a large house in the
first place, which would reduce the negative consumption impact. So the results are
mixed. As Figure A·6 shows, the two alternative specifications are very close to the
baseline.
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Figure A·5: Robustness Check: ζ
Note: Blue solid curve with dots shows the transition path of the baseline where the down
payment ratio ζ = 0.2. Red solid curve with crosses shows the transition path of an alternative
economy with ζ = 0.22. Green solid curve with solid dot shows that of an alternative with
ζ = 0.18. All variables are present in percentage deviations from the steady state.
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Figure A·6: Robustness Check: τ̄
Note: Blue solid curve with dots shows the transition path of the baseline where τ̄ = 0.03. Red
solid curve with crosses shows the transition path of an alternative economy with τ̄ = 0.035. Green
solid curve with solid dot shows that of an alternative with τ̄ = 0.025. All variables are present in
percentage deviations from the steady state.
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A.8 Alternative Measures of the Transition Path
In the main text, the transition paths of average choices conditional on adjustment
status is calculated using a fixed steady state share to rule out composition changes.
Figure A·7 plots the same thing but with dynamic shares along the transition path.
Due to the composition changes, the dynamics are more volatile but preserve the
same pattern qualitatively. From the bottom left panel, we can see that the share
of adjustors decrease while that of the non-adjustors increase. This is because the
decreasing house price reduces the option value to adjust now. From the change of
average wages (middle right), we can see that relatively rich households remain as
adjustors, while the relatively poor ones become non-adjustors.
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Figure A·7: Transition Path by Adjustment Status
Note: Blue solid curve with dots shows the transition path of adjustors. Red solid curve with
crosses show the transition path of non-adjustors. Black dotted line shows the steady state level.
All variables are present in percentage deviations from the steady state except for the shares of
each group, which is shown in level.
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